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TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DIVISION OF LABOR: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY IN CHINA 
 
The concomitance of prosperity and poverty come as an enigma in today’s world. 
As some people in this world benefit greatly from advanced technologies and 
globalization, others are still suffering heavily from poverty. One noticeable fact is that 
almost all developing countries have their own distinguished “poor area”. Such poor 
areas seem to persist regardless of robust economic growth enjoyed by the overall 
economy. 
By decomposing the developing country into two regions, one rich coastal region 
and one poor inland region, this research establishes a new classical general equilibrium 
3X2 Ricardian model to investigate how trade liberalization will affect the participation 
in the division of labor by poor individuals in the inland region in a developing country 
and their associated welfare change under different trading conditions. 
Our model of division of labor on poverty delineates the interdependent 
relationship between individuals in the poor inland region, the rich coastal region and the 
developed country. Market integration plays a very important role in such 
interdependency. Low transaction efficiency is the bottle-neck constraint on the poor 
inland region’s integration into international division of labor through international trade. 
Thus, it is critical for the poor inland region to improve the market transaction efficiency 
in order to enjoy gains from trade. 
Our marginal and inframarginal analysis show that as an important part of trade 
liberalization policy, tariff reduction may not always be a good policy choice for the 
developing country to alleviate the poverty. Whether tariff reduction makes the inland 
region better off depends on the initial general equilibrium market structure and the 
developing country’s power of influencing its terms of trade. If the developing country is 
large enough to determine the terms of trade in international trade with the developed 
country, the developing country may increase the welfare level of the poor inland region 
by increasing its tariff rate. But the developed country will oppose it because the tariff 
rate increase in the developing country will hurt its welfare. Trade negotiation is then 
necessary to determine the final tariff rate and the share of gains of trade to each country 
and region.  
 
KEYWORDS:  Trade Liberalization, Poverty in China, Incomplete Market Integration,  
Inframarginal Analysis, Division of Labor 
 
 
 
 
Xuehua Peng 
 
October 10, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DIVISION OF LABOR: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY IN CHINA 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
Xuehua Peng 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael R. Reed 
Director of Dissertation  
 
David Freshwater 
Director of Graduate Studies  
 
October 17, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RULES FOR THE USE OF DISSERTATIONS  
 
 
Unpublished dissertations submitted for the Doctor’s degree and deposited in the 
University of Kentucky Library are as a rule open for inspection, but are used only with 
due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but 
quotations or summaries of parts may be published only with permission of the author, 
and with the usual scholarly acknowledgments.  
 
 
Extensive copying or publication of the dissertation in whole or in part also requires the 
consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Kentucky.  
 
 
A library that borrows this dissertation for use by its patrons is expected to secure the 
signature of each user.  
 
 
Name                                                                                                             Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Xuehua Peng 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Graduate School  
 
 
University of Kentucky  
 
 
2006  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DIVISION OF LABOR: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY IN CHINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION  
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
College of Agriculture  
at the University of Kentucky  
 
 
By  
Xuehua Peng 
 
Lexington, Kentucky  
 
Director: Dr. Michael R. Reed, Professor of Agricultural Economics  
 
Lexington, Kentucky  
 
2006  
 
Copyright © Xuehua Peng 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my beloved wife, Chang Liu 
with many thanks and endless love! 
 iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
I would like to express my great gratitude and sincere appreciation to my advisor, 
Dr. Michael R. Reed, for his invaluable contribution and advice. It’s been a great blessing 
for me to study and research under Dr. Reed’s teaching academically and spiritually 
during the past years. It’s absolutely a pleasure and honor for me to work closely with 
him on this dissertation topic. He’s so knowledgeable, dedicated and passionate about 
economics research that he inspired me a lot to solve countless problems and issues to 
accomplish this dissertation. Dr. Reed also financially supports me to attend several 
conferences, as well as to purchase Mathematica software which I used a lot for this 
dissertation research.  
Next, I give my deepest appreciation to the members of my dissertation 
committee, Dr. David Freshwater, Dr. Sayed Saghaian, Dr. William Hoyt and Dr. P. 
Karan for their instructive comments, critiques, and advice that enriched this dissertation.  
The Graduate School generously supports my dissertation research through the 
Dissertation Enhancement Award and the Commonwealth Research Award. With Dr. 
Lynn Robbins’efforts and help, the department sponsored my trips to many professional 
meetings such as American Agricultural Economics Associate annual meetings, Southern 
Agricultural Economics Association annual meetings, and other professional meetings to 
present my research findings. In addition, I appreciate all the stuff members in the 
department for their great services all the time. Without them, this research cannot be 
done. 
Particularly, I would like to extend my great gratitude to my spiritual mentor and 
great friend, Richard Neal at Porter Memorial Baptist Church. Being an American father 
to me, Richard is always willing to unconditionally love me. He spends enormous time 
with me sharing his work ethic and precious experiences as an engineer, farmer and 
God’s faithful servant, as well as encouraging me to press on, which becomes a sweet 
memory and treasure for me to cherish all my life. Of course, my thanks also go to 
Wanda Neal, my American Mother for her unconditional love building me up step by 
step. 
 iv
I can’t find appropriate words to express how much I appreciate my family for 
their emotional support back in China. My Dad, Fuming Chen and my Mom, Jinlian 
Yang did their best to help us continue on education, regardless of great financial 
difficulties they’d been facing. I’m proud of being your son. Besides, I’m grateful for my 
brothers, Yihua, Yunhua and Juhua. 
Last but not least, my thanks and appreciation goes to my wife, Chang Liu. Chang, 
you’ve been bringing me so much joy, encouragement, prayer and delicious food during 
those busy days! It’s the greatest blessing in my life to have you as my wife!  
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii 
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... ….viii 
LIST OF FILES ............................................................................................................ ….ix 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
1.1 Poverty Challenges In This World.......................................................................1 
1.2 Issues and Objectives...........................................................................................4 
1.3 Structure of this dissertation ................................................................................6 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................7 
2.1. Theory of Poverty .....................................................................................................7 
2.1.1. Concepts of Poverty...........................................................................................7 
2.1.2. Measurements of Poverty ................................................................................12 
2.1.3. Causes of Poverty ............................................................................................16 
2.2. Relationship between Trade Liberalization and Poverty ........................................19 
2.2.1. Analytical Framework .....................................................................................19 
2.2.2. Analysis on Trade Liberalization and Poverty.................................................21 
2.3. Evolution of Division of Labor and Poverty Alleviation........................................24 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
CHINA’S POVERTY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT.....................................................30 
3.1. Poverty in China ................................................................................................30 
3.2.     China’s Foreign Trade and Poverty Reduction...................................................41 
 vi
CHAPTER FOUR 
NEW CLASSICAL TRADE-POVERTY MODEL ..........................................................60 
4.1.  New classical general equilibrium trade model: Free Trade .....................................60 
4.1.1. New Classical 2x2 Ricardian Model Under Free Trade ..................................60 
4.1.2. Solutions for the General Equilibrium.............................................................65 
4.1.3. General equilibrium Analysis ..........................................................................85 
4.2. New classical general equilibrium trade model: Introduction of Tariff .................89 
 
CHAPTER  FIVE 
EXTENDED 3X2 NEW CLASSICAL TRADE-POVERTY MODEL ..........................111 
5.1 Extended 3X2 New Classical Trade-Poverty Model .............................................112 
5.2. General Equilibrium Analysis...............................................................................118 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
SUGGESTIONS ..............................................................................................................133 
6.1. Policy Implications ...............................................................................................133 
6.2 Conclusions............................................................................................................138 
6.3 Suggestions for Future Research ...........................................................................140 
 
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………...145 
 
VITA…………………………………………………………………….……………154 
 
 
 vii
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 3.1: Poverty Incidence by Province (1985, 1993, and 2001).................................. 52 
Table 3.2: Selected Indicators at County-level in 2001. ................................................... 54 
Table 3.3: National Government’s Investment in China’s Poor Areas by Program 
(billion Yuan), 1986-97. ................................................................................. 56 
Table 3.4: China’s Promise on Tariff Reduction .............................................................. 56 
Table 3.5: China’s Foreign Merchandise Trade in 1976-2005 
(US$ billion at current prices)......................................................................... 57 
Table 3.6: Regional Trade, export and import value in 2004. .......................................... 58 
Table 4.1:  Four Corner Equilibria in the Ricardian Model............................................ 104 
Table 4.2: Parameter Subspace for Each Market Structure ............................................ 105 
Table 4.3:  Four Corner Equilibria in the Ricardian Model: With Tariff and 1iμ = ..... 106 
Table 4.4:  Four Corner Equilibriums in the Ricardian Model: With Tariff and 0iμ = 108 
Table 4.5: Per Capita Real Income Change in the 2X2 Ricardian Model: 1iμ = .......... 110 
Table 4.6: Per Capita Real Income Change in the 2X2 Ricardian Model: 0iμ = ......... 110 
Table 5.1: Corner Equilibriums in 3X2 Ricardo Model : 1 2 3 1μ μ μ= = = .................... 127 
Table 5.2: Corner Equilibriums in 3X2 Ricardo Model : 1 2 3 0μ μ μ= = = ................... 130 
Table 5.3: Welfare Impacts of Technology in the 3X2 Ricardian Model ...................... 131 
Table 5.4: Welfare Impacts of Tariff Change in the 3X2 Ricardian Model 
( 1 2 3 1μ μ μ= = = ).................................................................................................... 131 
Table 5.5: Welfare Impacts of Tariff Change in the 3X2 Ricardian Model 
( 1 2 3 0μ μ μ= = = )................................................................................................... 132 
 viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Issues in Trade and Poverty............................................................................ 28 
Figure 2.2: Alan Winter’s Analytical Framework For Linking Trade Liberalization and 
Poverty ...................................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 3.1: China’s Official Poverty line and rural poverty headcounts (1978-2002) ..... 48 
Figure 3.2: Official Institutional Structure of China’s Poverty Alleviation ..................... 49 
Figure 3.3: Key Counties in National Poverty Alleviation Program in 2001................... 50 
Figure 3.4: Allocation of Subsidized Credits and loans for poverty alleviation plan in 
China in 2002............................................................................................................ 51 
Figure 4.1: Configurations and Structures ...................................................................... 103 
Figure 4.2: Economies of division of labor based on exogenous technical advantages . 105 
Figure 5.1: Configurations and market structures when international trade is absent.... 124 
Figure 5.2: Configurations and Market Structures When the Inland Region is Excluded
................................................................................................................................. 125 
Figure 5.3: Configurations and Market Structures with the Poverty Region in Trade ... 126 
Figure 6.1: Trend of Marketization Index by Regions in China: 1978-1998 ................. 144 
 
 ix
LIST OF FILES 
 
1. Xuehua Peng-Dissertation.pdf 
 
  1
CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Most of the people in the world are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor we 
would know much of the economics that really matters. Most of the world’s poor people earn 
their living from agriculture, so if we knew the economics of agriculture we would know much of 
the economics of being poor.” 
--  Theodore T. Schultz, 1980. 
 
1.1 Poverty Challenges In This World 
The concomitance of prosperity and poverty come as an enigma in today’s world. As 
some people in this world benefit greatly from advanced technologies and globalization, others 
are still suffering heavily from poverty. Their basic needs for living cannot be satisfied. They 
work hard but still are impoverished by hunger, insufficient shelter, illiteracy, illness and early 
death. This situation hasn’t changed since Schultz gave his Nobel lecture about the economics of 
being poor in 1980. The poverty issue remains a central theme of economics.  
Current statistics on poverty show that one-fourth of the world’s population (more than 
1.2 billion people) are suffering from extreme poverty by living on less than $1 per day; more 
than half of the world population (2.7 million in 2001) live on less than $2 per day; 1.3 billion 
have no access to clean water; three billion people have no access to sanitation and two billion 
people have no access to electricity (World Bank, 2003). The World Food Summit of 1996 in 
Rome stated that the global poverty population is growing each year by a further 25 million 
persons in the developing countries. Even though the proportion of people in poverty has 
  2
gradually declined during past decades, the absolute number has remained about the same 
because of population growth. Sustainable poverty reduction has become one of the most 
important challenges that the world is facing in this new millennium (Aisbett, et al., 2005).  
Most people believe that no one should be poor in this world. At the United Nations 
Millennium Summit in September 2000, the United Nations adopted Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) which set an agenda for a war on poverty. MDG include eight specific goals 
ranging from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS  and providing 
universal primary education by the target deadline of 2015. Many countries have made 
marvelous progress in the battle against poverty in order to assure that poor people can meet their 
basic living needs. Global poverty rates are falling, especially in Asia. However, millions more 
people in Sub-Saharan Africa have sunk deep into poverty (United Nations, 2005).  
Developed countries have a responsibility to help developing countries to achieve the 
MDG goals because the whole world is like one body as described in the bible:  
“The body is a unit, though it is made up of many parts; and though all its parts are many, 
they form one body…. But God has combined the members of the body and has given greater 
honor to the parts that lacked it, so that there should be no division in the body, but that its parts 
should have equal concern for each other. If one part suffers, every part suffers with it; if one part 
is honored, every part rejoices with it.”  
-- 1 Corinthians 12:12-26, New International Version Bible   
 
As the most populous country in the world, China has provided successful examples of 
how to fight the worldwide war on poverty. During the last two decades, the People’s Republic 
of China (henceforth China) has made marvelous achievements in rural poverty reduction since 
the economic reform of the late 1970’s. In terms of the official poverty line, China has reduced 
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its rural poor population from 250 million in 1978 to 80 million in 1993 and further to 28 million 
in 2002. The percentage of poor people in the rural population has declined from 31 percent to 3 
percent (Wang, 2004).  
Such progress against poverty has taken place in the context of the third great wave of 
‘globalization’ (rising economic openness and integration of national economies)1. Thus many 
international organizations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and others, claimed that globalization is good for the poor. 
They are very optimistic about globalization and assert that in the long run open economies 
perform better than closed economies (Winters, 2002). Thus they have strongly proposed 
openness and trade liberalization policies to developing countries for the last fifteen years. 
However, there are growing concerns about possible adverse impacts on the poor and the 
unequal income distribution which may be associated with trade liberalization policies.  
Wade cautioned that we must be agnostic about the poverty headcount (level and trend) 
because current statistics have serious deficiencies which result in a huge margin for error. Based 
on the World Bank’s statistics, the falling trend of poverty disappears if we take out China and 
the poverty trend is clearly increasing if we take out India as well. Therefore, falling income 
inequality is not a generalized feature of the world economy during this third wave of 
globalization. The actual poverty numbers are higher than the World Bank’s statistics and the 
absolute numbers have increased rather than decreased over the past two decades. Even though 
                                                        
1 The first wave of globalization was 1870-1914, the second was 1945-1980 and the third was 1980 to the present (World Bank, 
2002).  
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the proportion of the world’s population in extreme poverty has fallen in the past two decades, 
increased world population may have contributed to this plausible trend (Wade, 2004). The 
association of poverty with progress is still an enigma for today’s world2.  
1.2 Issues and Objectives 
A wide range of policies may contribute to China’s progress, including fast general 
economic growth, targeted poverty reduction programs, trade policies, fiscal and monetary 
policies, and other social and economic policies. It is very challenging to separate the impacts of 
trade liberalization on poverty from other policies in the empirical study. Thus current research 
on trade liberalization and poverty may be very likely to exaggerate the impacts of trade 
liberalization on poverty reduction. 
The impact of trade liberalization on poverty hinges on an effective transmission 
mechanism that moves from the border to the inland. Price movement at the border from trade 
liberalization affects poor rural farmers in inland regions only if domestic markets are integrated. 
Without market integration, opening the border does not affect most poor farm communities. 
Agricultural product and factor markets play a key role in this transmission mechanism. Winters 
constructed an analytical framework to describe the transmission mechanism through which 
price changes associated with the removal of border trade barriers are passed through the 
economic system to affect the welfare of rich and poor households (Winters, 2000). However, 
most existing literature analyzes the poverty impacts of trade liberalization at an aggregated 
                                                        
2 In the 1870s American economist Henry George remarked that ‘the association of poverty with progress is the great enigma of 
our times’ (George, 2005).  
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national level, ignoring the impact of incompletely integrated markets.  
The reality in much of the developing countries is that agricultural markets are 
functioning ineffectively due to poor communications and transport infrastructure, limited rule of 
law, and restricted access to commercial finance (Barrett, 2005). This means that markets are not 
spatially integrated within the country. For example, China’s markets were becoming less, rather 
than more, integrated during much of the reform period (Young, 2000).  
At issue here is how trade liberalization impacts the poor in remote and inland regions 
given the condition of incompletely integrated markets within countries. This dissertation 
research aims to investigate the impacts of trade liberalization on the poor in the remote and 
inland region in a developing country like China, from a perspective of the division of labor. The 
approach to tackle this issue is to establish a new classical general equilibrium 3X2 Ricardian 
model (three region and two products). The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to 
investigate how the poor in the inland region will participate in the division of labor under 
different trading conditions.   
This research contributes to the literature on trade liberalization and poverty in at least 
two ways. First, this research aims to build a new classical general equilibrium model to 
investigate how trade liberalization will affect the welfare of the poor in the inland region given 
different trading conditions. Individuals in each region will make decisions on what products 
they should specialize in and then quantities of their production, consumption and trade. We 
allow for corner solutions in order to investigate multiple general equilibrium situations resulted 
from different productivity and trade efficiency. 
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Second, this research provides a framework which may unify all current poverty theories. 
Any factors affecting poverty (poverty alleviation or poverty entrapment) at the individual, 
regional, national and international level will change the division of labor in the socioeconomic 
system and the associated welfare levels. We can incorporate these factors into our model 
through their impacts on transaction costs.   
1.3 Structure of this Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows: following this introduction, chapter two provides 
a literature review on poverty and trade. Then, background information about trade and poverty 
issues in China is covered in Chapter three. Chapter four establishes a standard 2X2 new 
classical general equilibrium Ricardian model to analyze the impacts of trade liberalization on a 
poor developing country. Chapter five extended the model into a 3X2 new classical general 
equilibrium Ricardian model by dividing the developing country into a rich coastal region and a 
poor inland region. Chapter six draws some policy implications from the modeling results and 
highlights some future research directions after some concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Xuehua Peng 2006 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Theory of Poverty 
2.1.1.  Concepts of Poverty 
Poverty is not an abstract concept but visible and sensate to real individuals and 
households. One can define poverty in a very descriptive way as a poor man in Kenya did as 
follows: 
 
“Don’t ask me what poverty is because you have met it outside my house. Look at the 
house and count the number of holes. Look at my utensils and the clothes that I am 
wearing. Look at everything and write what you see. What you see is poverty. 
 —A poor man, Kenya 1997” (Narayan, et al., 2000, page 30). 
 
 
Poor people have their own understanding about what poverty means materially and 
psychologically, just as the poor man in Kenya quoted above. The World Bank report series 
Voices of the Poor provided a rich picture of poor people’s experience around the world based on 
field work in a total of fifty-eight developing and underdeveloped countries. In order to more 
accurately identify the poor in need and then design and offer the most effective type of help to 
them, scholars attempt to define poverty more precisely and specifically. The definition of 
poverty should be helpful in measuring and explaining poverty phenomenon and designing 
poverty alleviation policy.  
Definitions of poverty vary in terms of their narrowness and breadth. However, as argued 
by Nolan and Whelan (1996), a definition of poverty should not be too broad to run into the 
danger of losing insight of the distinctive core notion of poverty. Since the creative work on 
poverty by Amartya Sen, scholars have improved and deepened their understanding of the 
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concept of poverty. Based on the entitlement approach proposed by Sen, the World Bank 
provided a general definition of poverty as “inability to attain the minimal standard of living” in 
its 1990 World Development Report (World Bank, 1990). The World Bank has expanded the 
dimension of the minimal living standard to encompass not only material deprivation, including 
food, water, shelter, and clothing, but also low levels of education and health, exposure to 
vulnerability and risk, voicelessness and powerlessness (World Bank, 1990; 2000). Such a 
multidimensional approach captures the complete range of deprivation that constitutes poverty, 
and gives much credence to the views of the poor themselves. However, multidimensional 
approaches lack the precision and comparability of income/consumption measures which are 
commonly used by economists. 
The definition of poverty refers to the inability not the reality. For example, a person may 
have the ability to avoid hunger, but may choose to fast or use limited income to purchase lottery 
tickets instead. In reality, this individual suffers from hunger (one basic form of poverty). 
However, he/she has the ability of not suffering from it by changing his/her consumption and 
expenditure pattern. Thus, this person should not be accounted as poor according to the 
definition of poverty. However, it may not be easy to distinguish the inability and reality in 
practice. A definition of poverty in practice may be different from a theoretical definition.  
Since poverty results from a combination of economic, social, political and 
environmental factors, poverty has to be defined in a particular context (Tiemstra, 2004). 
Tiemstra illustrated this by comparing two societies where everyone made $1000 in one society 
while half the people made $2000 and half made $20,000 in another society. One may claim that 
the poor in the latter society may be better off because they have much higher incomes available 
for their consumption. However, this may not be true. For example, in the former society, 
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everyone might use the public bus transportation system. In the latter society, many rich people 
own their private cars. The public bus transportation system may then be crowded out, which 
makes those people who cannot afford a car worse off. It is luxury for people in developing 
societies to own a car, while it may be necessary for people in industrialized societies like the 
United States to own and drive a car in order to escape from poverty (Fletcher, et al., 2002). 
Certainly, there is no clear and unvarying concept of universally accepted minimal living 
standard. Everybody would agree that people need adequate levels of food, clothing and shelter 
as human beings living in this world. If we assign a fixed absolute real value to the minimal 
living standard (poverty line), we use a concept of absolute poverty. Absolute poverty measures 
the number of people who live below the poverty line with a fixed real value or the number of 
individuals or households unable to afford the minimum living standard. If the poverty line is 
defined with respect to the population’s average level of chosen welfare indicators, we have a 
definition of relative poverty. 
Relative poverty and inequality may cause some social problems such as crime and 
pollution. Thus, relative poverty may become a drag on economic growth because it increases 
the cost for government and institutions to deal with such social problems (Tiemstra, 1992). In 
addition, Ravallion (1997) found that the initial inequality conditions did matter on how much 
the poor share in rising average incomes. Higher initial inequality tends to reduce the positive 
impact of growth on absolute poverty reduction and to diminish the adverse impact on the poor 
of overall contraction. Poverty specifically refers to the lowest quantile in the inequality 
spectrum those who are not able to attain the minimum living standards. Thus, poverty is closely 
related to the inequality issue. 
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Although an absolute poverty concept should, and does, include the relative notion of 
what constitutes “basis needs” or requirements for a minimal living standard, we must still 
consider the poverty concept as an absolute notion about people’s living situation in a society 
(Ray, 1998; Sen, 1983). Even though relative poverty matters to the welfare of the poor, absolute 
poverty dominates (Ravallion, 1994). 
Poverty is also a concept manifesting itself at multiple levels. To get a full picture of 
poverty, a poverty analysis should integrate macro, meso and micro levels. At the international 
level, about 900 million, or 75 percent of the world’s poor, live in the Asian and Pacific region, 
including Central Asia. About one in three Asians is poor. Almost all countries have their own 
distinguished “poor area” where the incidence rate of poverty is unusually high by national 
standards. In China, a large number of poor people are clustered in rural areas of the southwest 
and northwest. Similar situations exist in other countries including some of the eastern Outer 
Islands of Indonesia, parts of northeastern India, northwestern and southern rural areas of 
Bangladesh, much of northern Nigeria, the rural Savannah in Ghana, the northeast of Brazil, and 
many other places (Ravallion and Wodon, 1999). Such poor areas seem to persist regardless of 
robust economic growth enjoyed by the overall economy.  
Poverty also manifests at the meso level such as the county, township and village levels. 
In practice, we can investigate the poverty situation at the household level by using the available 
household-level data on expenditure and income. It is found that poverty also manifests itself at 
the individual level because resources may be unevenly distributed among individuals within a 
household in terms of gender and age (Atkinson, 1998). To correctly extrapolate the individual 
poverty situation from household-level data, one should consider the intra-household welfare 
distribution.  
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Barrett and Swallow offered an explanation to the fractal poverty trap in which multiple 
dynamic equilibria exist simultaneously at multiple (micro, meso and macro) scales of analysis 
and are reinforcing each other through feedback effects (Barrett and Swallow, 2005). Because 
governments, markets and communities in poor areas characterized by fractal poverty traps are 
simultaneously weak, small adjustments at any one of these multiple scales alone are unlikely to 
be strong enough to shift the system away from its dominant, stable dynamic equilibrium of 
poverty. 
Not only the magnitude of poverty but also the nature and duration of poverty matters 
and differentiates much of the developing world from wealthy countries (Barrett and Swallow, 
2005). In wealthy countries, anti-poverty policies largely focus on the provision of safety nets to 
cushion the poor so that they can stand against temporary shocks or recover quickly. In the 
developing countries, however, the task of combating poverty is much more challenging. The 
poor suffer deeply from severe material deprivation and also the feeling of hopelessness induced 
from such dim prospects (Barrett and Swallow, 2005).  
The concepts of chronic poverty and transient (temporary) poverty are used to describe 
the duration of poverty. Morduch pointed out that the notion of chronic poverty must be 
complemented by a study of temporary poverty (Morduch, 1994). Jalan and Ravallion 
distinguish transient poverty (temporary poverty) from chronic poverty in terms of a household’s 
consumption pattern over time (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998). Transient poverty is defined as the 
poverty attributed to intertemporal consumption variability and chronic poverty is defined as the 
poverty that persists in mean consumption over time. The degree of transient poverty will differ 
among areas because households are exposed to different income risks.  
  12
There are three main reasons to distinguish transient poverty and chronic poverty. First, 
transient poverty and chronic poverty should be weighted differently in assessing overall 
progress against poverty. Second, different types of poverty call for different policies.  Policies 
to increase the human and physical assets of poor people and to increase returns to these assets 
mainly target chronic poverty. Insurance and income-stabilization schemes are more important 
policy instruments to fight transient poverty (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995). Thus, knowing the 
proportion of transient poverty in the currently observed overall poverty may inform policy 
choices. Third, if the government’s objective is to reduce chronic poverty, the government needs 
to know how much observed overall poverty is transient so that they can prevent resource 
leakage from the chronically poor to the transiently poor (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998).  
 
2.1.2.  Measurements of Poverty 
Since researchers disagree on the definition and the methodology to measure poverty, 
there exists no consensus on measurements of poverty (choices of poverty line and poverty 
measure). Bowley proposed a head count measure of poverty in the early 1920s (Bowley and 
Hogg, 1925). Since then, subsequent researchers proposed many alternatives to measure poverty.  
Sen stated that the poverty measurement problem must include two distinct but related 
exercises, that is, identification of the poor and aggregation of poverty (Sen, 1981, 1976). 
Identification of the poor tries to answer who and where the poor are and aggregation of poverty 
attempts to aggregate the characteristics of the set of poor people into an overall image of 
poverty. In the money-metric approach, we can specify a subsistence income (expenditure) level 
as the poverty line and classify individuals with lower incomes (expenditures) than the poverty 
line as the poor.  The poverty line indicates the minimum level of “acceptable” economic 
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participation in a given society, or community, at a specific time point (Ray, 1998). For a non-
money metric approach, we can apply the same method to specify a corresponding poverty line 
to measure if an individual is poor.  
An income of $1 per day per person has become the international benchmark for poverty 
measurement in developing countries. This international poverty line was established according 
to studies on some 33 countries in the 1980s, expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) of 
1985 (Ravallion, et al., 1991). It has been updated using an expanded set of PPP values at 1993 
prices and the new international poverty line is $1.08 (World Bank, 2000). The PPP version of 
the international poverty line has some flaws and technical issues, which affect the reliability of 
global poverty trends measured by it (Vandemoortele, 2002, Wade, 2004).  
Among aggregate measures of poverty, the head count index is the most popular one used 
by economists and policymakers because of its simplicity. It measures the proportion of persons 
with incomes less than the poverty line. Another popular poverty measurement is the income gap 
ratio which is defined as the ratio of the gap between the poverty line and average income of the 
poor, expressed as a proportion of the poverty line. The poverty gap index captures the depth of 
poverty and indicates the potential cost of eliminating poverty by targeting transfers to the poor 
(Ravallion, 1992). However, both the head count index and income gap ratio share the same 
drawback of ignoring inequality among the poor.  
 Sen (1976) proposed two appealing axioms for a poverty measure to consider the income 
distribution among the poor: 
(1) Monotonicity axiom. Given other things, an income reduction of a person below the 
poverty line must increase the poverty measure.  
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(2) Transfer axiom. Given other things, a pure income transfer from a person below the 
poverty line to anyone who is less poor must increase the poverty measure. 
The best known measures addressing the income distribution among the poor is the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class proposed by Foster et al. (1984). The FGT class of poverty 
measurement is defined by 
1 ( )
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−= ∑              (2.1) 
where iy  denotes income (or expenditure) of individual i, p denotes the poverty line, n is 
the total population. Power α  can be any value.  For α = 0, the measure 0p  is reduced to the 
head count index. For α = 1, the measure 1p  is reduced to the poverty gap index.  
The “best practice” in poverty measures is to adjust for differences in the prices faced and 
household demographics. Even though the headcount index has received trenchant critiques, it 
remains very popular because of its rationale and simple formula. From the policy perspective, 
the means of setting poverty lines may matter more because they determine the interpersonal 
welfare comparisons and thus construct the resulting poverty profile (Ravallion, 1996). 
Unfortunately, many methods used in practice may not guide policies in the right direction. For 
example, the poverty lines used as deflators do not account well for the cost-of-living differences 
facing the poor without considering spatial price differences (Ravallion, 1994). It may be 
irrelevant for anti-poverty policies to set poverty lines as a constant proportion of the mean 
consumption or income for each subgroup or time period because no implications can be drawn 
about the absolute levels of living.  
Poverty indicators, such as poverty head counts, might change significantly due to 
changes in poverty measurement methodology without any real change in the well-being of the 
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population. Schelzig uses two surveys from Mongolia and Philipines to show that a seemingly 
slight variation in survey methodology can have a rather significant impact on poverty results 
(Schelzig, 2001). Thus, Schelzig suggests assessing poverty from a purely economic statistical 
approach toward multidisciplinary approaches. 
A single indicator cannot measure everything. In a multiple-indicator approach, we need 
to know what each indicator is measuring and why we use it. Four categories of indicators may 
be used (Ravallion, 1996): 
(1) A sensible poverty measure based on the distribution of real expenditures per single 
adult considering all goods and services from market and non-market sources.  
(2) Indicators of access to non-market goods and services such as access to education and 
health services. 
(3) Indicators of welfare distribution within households; measures of gender inequalities 
and child nutritional status. 
(4) Indicators of impacts of certain personal characteristics, such as physical handicaps 
and impairments, on the ability of escaping poverty.  
However, a multidimensional approach to poverty measurement is much more complex 
than a univariate approach. A so-called poverty dominance method is proposed for the purpose 
of multidimensional poverty measurements and comparisons 1 .  Different contexts demand 
different indicators. To assess the poverty effects of external trade liberalization, which is the 
focus of our research, it is appropriate to focus on income (consumption) poverty measures.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For detailed discussion on multidimensional poverty measurements, see Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982, 1987), Bourguignon 
and Chakravarty (2003), and Duclos and Makdissi (2005). 
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2.1.3.  Causes of Poverty 
There are two basic approaches to explain the causes of poverty: the aggregate approach 
and individual approach. Traditional development economics and macroeconomics belong to the 
first approach which investigates poverty at an aggregate level. Economic development is 
necessary for poverty alleviation. Thus, development economics explains poverty from economic 
growth and development.  
Early development theorists identified capital formation as the crucial component to 
accelerate development (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1953, 1967). For most poor 
developing countries, where domestic savings rate was typically low, there is a basic “boot-
strapping” problem. Low levels of existing capital stock in developing countries hinder capital 
formation. The old saying “it takes money to make money” applies to many poor developing 
countries. Lewis’s dual economy theory (1954, 1955) precisely stressed the role of savings in 
development. The Keynesians argued that government intervention can manipulate savings. 
Indeed, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argued that increasing returns to scale made government-
directed industrialization feasible. Singer (1964) and Myrdal (1970) reiterated that government 
intervention could turn "vicious circles" of low savings and low growth into "virtuous circles" of 
high savings and high growth. Thus, government involvement - whether by planning, socio-
economic engineering or effective demand management - was regarded as a critical tool of 
economic development.  
Although capital-formation never really left the field, the meaning of the term mutated 
somewhat over time. T.W. Schultz, a Nobel prize laureate in economics, turned away from 
physical capital accumulation to emphasize the need for "human capital" formation (Schultz, 
1980). This led to an emphasis on education and training as prerequisites for growth and 
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development and the identification of the problem of the "brain drain" from the Third World to 
the First (and from the private sector to government bureaucracies). Lewis and Singer extended 
Schultz's theory by arguing that social development as a whole - notably education, health, 
fertility, etc. - by improving human capital, was also a necessary prerequisite for growth.  
Since 1969, Dudley Seers pioneered the shift of development economics theory from 
economic growth to economic development (Seers, 1969). Seers argued that economic 
development was a social phenomenon that involved more than increasing per capita output. The 
purpose of development is to eliminate poverty, unemployment and inequality. Seers commented: 
“What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? 
What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have become less severe, then 
beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of 
these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange 
to call the result “development,” even if per capita income has soared.” 
(Seers, 1969, pages 3-4) 
 
Singer, Myrdal and Adelman acknowledged the validity of Seers' complaint. Thus, 
structural issues such as dualism, population growth, inequality, urbanization, agricultural 
transformation, education, health, unemployment, etc. all began to be reviewed on their own 
merits, and not merely as appendages to an underlying growth thesis.  
In contrast to an aggregate approach, many economists examine poverty from an 
individual approach. Sen views poverty as individuals’ incapabilities to achieve states of living. 
Sen focuses on a number of basic “functionings” central to an individual’s wellbeing, such as 
being adequately nourished, avoiding premature mortality, appearing in public without shame, 
being happy, and being free (Sen, 1985, Sen, 1981). Sen’s approach has become the foundation 
of the World Bank’s poverty research.  
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In addition to development economics theories, other theories are developed to explain 
the causes of poverty. For example, geographic conditions are also recognized as important 
factors affecting poverty. Gallup and Sachs used cross country and cross region data to show that 
the countries with favorable geographical conditions for transportation have better development 
performance (Gallup, et al., 1999). Poverty has a geography in three senses: (1) the spatial 
distribution of people poverty; (2) place poverty; (3) the lived experience within the physical and 
social space of a common community. The geographic attributes of a region determine the 
environment context that helps or hinders economic development. Places that are more isolated 
or that have fewer natural advantages are likely to have fewer economic opportunities, leading to 
smaller local industry and more economic difficulties. A focus on places bridges the gap between 
the concepts of poverty and social exclusion (Powell, et al., 2001).  
Durlauf (1999) developed a membership theory of poverty to analyze how 
socioeconomic groupings (aggregate level) affect individuals’ poverty situation. In membership 
models, individuals are identified into distinct groupings and assumed to be strongly influenced 
by groups such as the residential neighborhood in which they grow up, the schools they attend, 
and even their coworkers (Durlauf, 2006, 1999). The formal theory underlying membership 
models has important implications for the integration of different disciplines in social science 
into a unified framework on poverty (Blume and Durlauf, 2001). 
According to the social capital theory, economic failure has cultural roots with it. It 
would be extremely naïve to think that a prescription of pure economic policy alone could have a 
strong enough impact to break the vicious circle whereby poverty and exclusion from society are 
reproduced and poverty is perpetuated from one generation to the next (Ocampo, 2004).  
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In summary, poverty is not only an economic issue but also a societal issue. Poverty is 
not only an aggregate macro level issue but also an individual micro issue.  
 
2.2. Relationship between Trade Liberalization and Poverty 
2.2.1.  Analytical Framework 
Since the early 1950s, the relationship between trade and development has been an 
important policy issue. However, only recently has the relationship between trade and poverty 
been a subject of intense interest. Most policy-oriented poverty analysis before the 1990s ignored 
the influence of international economic relationships on poverty. Many economists believed that 
trade liberalization policy involving tariff reduction was a powerful engine of economic 
development (Krueger, 1997; World Bank, 1997).  
The World Bank placed the poverty reduction problem in a global context for the first 
time in its World Development Report 1990 (World Bank, 1990). In 1996, UNCTAD provided 
the first estimate of the impact of the international trade regime on poverty in developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 2004). In the last few years, there has been a proliferation of research on 
the subject of trade and poverty. 
Figure 2.1 summarizes issues related to the field of trade and poverty. As Figure 2.1 
shows, the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty is only a subset of various policy 
issues related to trade and poverty. Specifically, these policy issues include (1) the effects of 
primary commodity dependence; (2) the balance-of-payments constraint on poverty reduction; (3) 
the relationship between export and import instability and vulnerability; (4) the relationship 
between upgrading the composition of exports towards higher-quality and higher-skill products 
and the social exclusion of poorer producers from livelihoods; (5) bargaining power in global 
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production chains and the distribution of gains from trade; (6) how the development of non-
traditional exports affects gender relations; (7) the effects of trends in, and variability of, the 
terms of trade on poverty; (8) the relationship between trade and employment; and (9) the 
relationships between trade and inequality.  
Current research on trade and poverty narrowly focuses on trade liberalization and 
poverty. The great merit of the current work on trade liberalization and poverty is that it is very 
good at understanding the direct impact on poverty of changes associated with trade 
liberalization. The current approach is less good at understanding the indirect impact of a 
country’s wide range of trade policy changes on poverty (UNCTAD, 2004).  
Winters and others constructed an analytical framework to identify the various channels 
at the national level through which price changes associated with trade liberalization are “passed 
through” the economic system to influence the welfare of richer and poorer households 
(McCulloch, et al., 2001, Winters, et al., 2004). As shown in Figure 2.2, trade policy reform is 
seen as a price shock which has (1) expenditure effects, which arise because of changes in the 
prices of consumption goods; (2) income and employment effects, which arise because of 
changes in the remuneration of production factors; (3) effects on changes in tariff revenues and 
taxes, which affect transfers and the provision of public goods, as well as affecting the risk and 
uncertainty that poor households face due to a rise in short-term and medium-term adjustment 
costs. This framework integrates the macro level and household level. New methodologies have 
been proposed to empirically investigate the links between trade and poverty using this general 
framework. However, the ongoing methodological work on trade liberalization and poverty is 
generating ever more technically complex models which in turn spawn their own empirical and 
methodological controversies (UNCTAD, 2004).  
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2.2.2.  Analysis on Trade Liberalization and Poverty 
There have been debates on trade liberalization and poverty in developing countries for 
years. Some observers have argued that trade liberalization benefits the poor in developing 
countries while others argue that the benefits are seized only by those who are not particularly 
poor. The methods to tackle this issue empirically can be divided into five broad categories: 
cross-country comparisons, aggregate time series analyses at the country level, partial 
equilibrium or cost-of-living analyses, general equilibrium analyses and general equilibrium 
micro-simulation analyses2.  
A large body of literature using cross-country comparisons does not have consensus on 
the impact of trade openness on poverty within countries. Dollar and Kraay (2001) used a sample 
of six globalizing countries, China, India, Brazil, Thailand, Argentina and Bangladesh, to study 
the relationship among the trade liberalization, growth, and national poverty. All these countries 
sharply reduced tariff rates in the 1990s and thus increased international trade in terms of trade 
value and its ratio to GDP. Their findings suggested that trade liberalization tended to be 
associated with accelerated growth and poverty reduction in the 1990s. In 2002, Dollar and 
Kraay used a larger sample of developing countries to show that trade liberalization benefited the 
poor to the same extent that it benefited the whole economy (Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  
Despite difficulties in distinguishing between correlation and causation in such cross-
country regression analysis and the challenge of robust specification tests (Rodrik, 2000), the 
cross-country regression approach can provide much more general conclusions than the country-
specific simulation models.  
                                                 
2 The various methods used in the literature and the findings of past researches are discussed in the useful surveys by McCulloch, 
et al., 2001; Reimer, 2002; Ravallion, 2004. 
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Ravallion (2004) uses aggregate time series data on China from 1980 to 2000 to test the 
claim that China’s greater openness has been an important factor in reducing poverty. Both 
current and lagged trade volume are found to have an insignificant impact on poverty in China. 
Their research casts doubt on the view that greater openness to external trade in China has been 
the driving force in poverty reduction. Many “non-trade” factors appears to have played an 
important role in China’s success in poverty alleviation. 
The third general approach to estimate the poverty impacts of trade liberalization is 
partial-equilibrium/cost-of-living analyses. Litch et al. (2003) use a partial equilibrium approach 
to examine the impacts of agricultural trade liberalization on poverty in three developing 
countries, Vietnam, China and Zambia. A discrete-time proportional odds model is estimated for 
China. Huang et al. (2003) use their own partial equilibrium model, the China Agricultural 
Policy Simulation (CAPSIM), to assess the impacts of trade liberalization. Based on eleven 
income groups in three regions in China, they disaggregate the data into thirty-three groups 
(11×3=33). They find that farmers in all regions and all income categories will benefit from 
trade liberalization on average while the richer farmers in coastal areas will benefit more than 
poorer inland markets.  
The general equilibrium approach has been used in welfare analysis of trade liberalization. 
The advantage of the general equilibrium approach is that it can assess the impact of economic 
shocks which reverberate across sectors, regions of a country or even the world. Anderson et al. 
(2004) use the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) version 5 to assess the impact of China’s 
WTO accession on farmer incomes. In contrast to Huang et al.’s partial equilibrium study, this 
research finds that the incidence of rural non-farm poverty will fall mainly because of the growth 
in wages for unskilled workers in rural non-farm activities. Poverty may well increase in 
  23
agriculturally based hinterland provinces a long way from markets and in regions poorly served 
with the necessary infrastructure. 
The fifth general approach to assess the impact of trade liberalization on poverty is 
computable general equilibrium with micro-simulation analysis. In essence, this approach is a 
sequential two-step simulation model. A general equilibrium model is first shocked to obtain 
commodity and factor price changes, and then these prices are fed into or calibrated to a post-
simulation framework that calculates the effects on actual or highly disaggregated representative 
households.  
Robilliard et al. (2001) build a general equilibrium model based on a single-region Social 
Accounting Matrix that captures macroeconomic constraints along with intersectoral flows in 
Indonesia. The post-simulation analysis is then conducted with survey data on 33,000 individuals 
in 9,800 households. Hertel et al. (2004) use a similar approach to find that multi-lateral trade 
liberalization will reduce overall poverty in Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda, and Zambia, but 
increase overall poverty in Brazil, Chile, and Thailand. However, to our knowledge there is no 
work yet that looks at trade and poverty using such a two-step CGE micro-simulation model.   
With the development of research methodology used in trade and poverty, little attention 
has been paid to the incomplete market integration. Beghin and Fang (2002) argue that there is 
measurement bias in comparative advantage analysis in the presence of incomplete market 
integration.  
McCulloch et al. concluded that the links between trade liberalization and poverty are 
very country-specific (McCulloch, et al., 2001). Empirical studies showed that trade 
liberalization reduced the absolute poverty rate in some countries while increased it in other 
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countries. However, McCulloch et al. did not answer what factors determined the specific 
relationship between trade liberalization and poverty in a specific country. 
 
2.3. Evolution of Division of Labor and Poverty Alleviation  
In neoclassical economics, economies of scale are considered as the most important 
driving force for economic growth (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Ethier, 1979; Krugman, 1979; 
Romer, 1990). Young argued that the notion of economies of scale captured the quantitative 
aspects but missed the qualitative aspects of economies from division of labor. He explained: 
“The mechanism of increasing returns is not to be discerned adequately by observing the 
effects of variations in the size of an individual firm or of a particular industry, for the 
progressive division of labor and specialization of industries is an essential part of the process by 
which increasing returns are realized. What is required is that industrial operations be seen as an 
interrelated whole.”  (Young, 1928, page 539). 
 
Suppose in a society consisting of three ex ante identical individuals (A, B and C) who 
prefer diverse consumption and specialization in production of three goods x, y and z. If 
individual A chooses to completely specialize in producing good x, he will demand goods y and z 
from the market. The other two individuals (or at least one of them) must specialize in producing 
goods y and z and selling them to individual A. If individual A chooses self-sufficiency of goods 
x and y but produces no good z, he will demand good z from the market. At least one of the other 
two individuals needs to specialize in producing good z and selling them to individual A. If two 
individuals (A and B) choose self-sufficiency of all goods, then individual C cannot choose 
specialization. Therefore, each individual’s decision as to his own level of specialization not only 
determines his own productivity, but also determines the extent of the market for the produce of 
others, thereby imposing a constraint in their decisions on their levels of specialization and 
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productivity (Yang, 2001). Young summarized such features of the network effects of the 
division of labor and the related market in the Young theorem: 
“the securing of increasing returns depends on the progressive division of labor … not 
only the division of labor depends upon the extent of the market, but the extent of the market 
also depends upon the division of labor … demand and supply are two sides of the division of 
labor.” (Young, 1928, page 539) 
 
 
In other words, division of labor is the source of increasing returns and economic 
development. Division of labor among individuals is connected through interactive transactions 
among individuals and thereby weaves a huge economic network. However, every transaction 
incurs costs. There is a trade-off between economies of division of labor and transaction costs. 
On the one hand, the positive network effects of division of labor on aggregate productivity 
encourage more transactions and further expand the economic network. On the other hand, 
transaction costs place constraints on the evolution of the division of labor. Increases in 
transaction costs will hinder the improvement in the division of labor and reduce transaction 
behaviors between individuals. Decreases in transaction costs will promote benefits in division 
of labor through more transactions among individuals.  
New classical economics integrates the division of labor and transaction costs and may 
provide a more powerful explanation for the mechanisms of economic development. We can also 
apply this new classical economics approach to poverty analysis. The economic development 
level of poor countries and poor regions within a country is determined by the degree of division 
of labor in the social economic network. Individuals’ poverty situation is affected by the extent 
that they participate in the division of labor. Trade liberalization will not only affect regional and 
individuals’ resource allocation, but also the division of labor between countries, regions and 
individuals.  
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Trade plays an important role in poverty alleviation by affecting the division of labor 
between countries, regions and individuals. Sen recognized the importance of trade in poverty 
alleviation in his entitlement approach where he defined trade as the exchange entitlements with 
others (Sen, 1981): 
“…it is quite possible that severe famine conditions can develop for reasons that are not 
directly connected with food production at all. The entitlement approach places food production 
within a network of relationship, and shifts in some these relations can precipitate gigantic 
famines even without receiving any impulse from food production. 
It is not my purpose to deny the importance of food production, or of some of the well-
analysed issues in international food policy. It is rewarding to consider international insurance 
arrangements to reduce the food supply vulnerability of particular countries. It is relevant to 
know international food aid affects domestic production and distribution, and the world food 
prices. It is also useful to do food balance sheets and integrate them into social account 
procedures, and to go into more elaborate analysis of ‘food systems’. The focus that emerges 
from this monograph looks at a different direction, namely the need to view the food problem as 
a relation between people and food in terms of a network of entitlement relations.” 
       (Sen, 1981, page 158-159). 
 
However, modern international trade theory takes a biased approach to analyze the 
international equality problem instead of the reality of underdevelopment. As Myrdal criticized, 
“When applying an immanent criticism to the theory of international trade, the biased 
approach it implies stands out in the unrealistic assumption of stable equilibrium – and a number 
of other assumptions related to that assumption. Even in later writings, it has been retained more 
tenaciously than in other parts of economic theory. Another unrealistic assumption is the notion 
that there are certain elements of social reality which can be characterized as the ‘economic 
factors,’ and that it is defensible to analyze international trade while abstracting from all other 
factors.”  (Myrdal, 1970, page 277). 
 
 
From these flawed assumptions, international trade theory mis-predicts about the effects 
of international trade and capital movements. Myrdal continued: 
 “Biased in this way, the international trade theory developed a thought that trade worked 
for the equalization of factor prices and incomes, in the first instance wages of labor. Trade 
would permit industrial activity to adapt itself to the location of natural and population resources 
in different countries and different regions, and this would have a generally equalizing effect on 
incomes everywhere.” (Myrdal, 1970, page 277).  
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Contrary to the predictions from traditional trade theory, the observed fact is that 
international trade and capital movements generally tend to allow inequality to thrive (Myrdal, 
1970). In the next section, we will apply the new classical economics approach to analyze the 
poverty impacts of trade liberalization.  
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Figure 2.1: Issues in Trade and Poverty 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2004 
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Figure 2.2: Alan Winter’s Analytical Framework For Linking Trade Liberalization and Poverty 
 
Source: Winters, 2002 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CHINA’S POVERTY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
3.1. Poverty in China 
The poverty reduction in China has been the most dramatic in history. Around 1980, 
China was still a country with the highest incidence of extreme poverty in the world. Through 
development over the past two decades, China has made tremendous achievements in reducing 
rural poverty. Nowadays China has a poverty rate slightly lower than the world average poverty 
rate. According to China’s official poverty line, the absolute poor population dramatically 
decreased from 250 million in 1978 to 128 million in 1984. After slowing in the late 1980s, the 
rapid decline in the poverty head count resumed in 1990s, decreasing to 26 million in 2004, and 
the poverty-stricken population as a proportion of the total rural population sharply decreased 
from 31% in 1978 to 15.1% in 1984 and then to 3% in 2002 (see Figure 3.1).  
Using the universal international poverty line developed by the World Bank, one can find 
higher levels but a similar trend in China’s poverty reduction. Noticeably, China uses different 
poverty lines at different time periods. China did not define any poverty line until the Chinese 
government launched a massive antipoverty program in 1985. The absolute poverty line was 
established at 300 Yuan per capita per year in 1990, reflecting the income required to meet 
minimum nutritional requirements (2,100 calories per day) and nonfood requirements and 
corresponds to about $0.70 per day in 1985 PPP dollars. The higher poverty line is set at 454 
Yuan (in 1990 prices) equivalent to $1.00 per day in 1985 PPP dollars. Both of these measures 
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are below the World Bank standard of $1.00 per day (in 1995 PPP dollars) of consumption 
expenditure. The Chinese definition of absolute poverty is the basis of the discussion unless 
otherwise indicated1.  
Three Stages in China’s Poverty Alleviation History 
China’s poverty alleviation can be divided into following three stages: 
The first stage is the rapid progress period from 1978 to 1985. During this period, the 
Chinese government took several measures to attack poverty. Specifically, there were four types 
of reforms which significantly enhanced the effects of participatory agricultural growth on 
poverty reduction. The first one was land reform and widespread decollectivization. Essentially, 
the Chinese government abandoned the centralized system of communal farming and began to 
introduce the “household responsibility system” which provided a strong foundation for the 
success of China’s economic reform. Chinese farmers were entitled to the freedom (and 
responsibility) for most of their farming activities so that they could make their own production 
and market decisions. Meanwhile, they were no longer bound to “Grain First” policies and 
strictly fixed grain quotas, which often forced them to participate in unproductive cultivation. 
Empirical studies showed that the total factor productivity in the household system was 
improved about 20% to 30% compared with that in the old collective system (Wen, 1993). The 
productivity growth contributed 54% of the output growth and 97% of the productivity growth 
stemmed from the change in farming institutions from collectivization to the household 
                                                 
1 There are different sources of bias with China’s official poverty estimates. It is necessary to look at other estimates using 
alternative methods and data sources. More detailed discussion on China’s poverty level can be found in Chen and Ravallion 
(1996).  
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responsibility system (Lin, 1996). The second was market-oriented reform. The Chinese 
government cut the grain procurement quota and decreased the number of planned product 
categories which were controlled by the government’s plan. Restrictions on interregional 
agricultural trade were lifted and private traders were allowed and encouraged to participate in 
interregional trade.  
The third was price reform. The Chinese government increased procurement prices for 
major crops, which directly contributed to output growth and income increases in rural China. 
The price reform was estimated to contribute about 16% of the output growth and 20% of the 
rural per capita income increase in 1978-84 (Lin, 1996). The fourth was migration policy. The 
Chinese government began to relieve some controls on migration and allow millions of rural 
residents to move temporarily or permanently to towns or cities in 1982. As a consequence of 
fundamental policy changes during this period, China’s food supply greatly improved and the 
rural areas began to develop. Agricultural and rural income grew faster than the average national 
income. Special grant funds and initiatives to spur growth were also directed to poor areas. The 
poverty rate was dramatically reduced.  
The second stage is the temporary setback period from 1986 to 1993. The government 
started to implement a series of formal poverty alleviation programs. The regional focus of the 
program was “the old revolutionary power base (usually economically backwards)” as well as 
“regions of national minority populations”. Institutionally, an office of the Leading Group for 
Economic Development in Poor Areas (LGEDPA) was established at the national level to 
monitor the expenditure of the poverty funds, coordinate efforts to alleviate poverty across a 
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number of sectors and be an advocate for the poor. Under this national organization, Poor Area 
Development Offices (PADO) were established at the provincial and county levels to 
administrate poverty funds from national and provincial sources (Tong, et al., 1995). However, as 
the one-time explosive impacts of the introduction of the household responsibility system and 
other agricultural policy changes ceased, agricultural and rural growth began to slow down. 
Meanwhile, China’s development strategy shifted from an agriculture-led development strategy 
to an export-led industrialization development strategy. Under the principle of “Let some people 
and regions become rich first and then lead all become rich”, coastal provinces and cities 
received favorable supports through public investment and fiscal incentives. This left the central 
and inland regions with fewer resources for development. The regional disparity began to 
increase and poverty reduction was set back during this period. 
The third stage, from 1993 to the present, resumed the progress in poverty reduction, 
although not as rapidly as during the first period. Responding to the reduced pace of poverty 
reduction in late 1980s, the Chinese government launched a targeted intervention program in 
1994 which was widely known as the 8-7 Poverty Reduction Program. The aim of this program 
was to “have basically eliminated absolute poverty throughout China by the year 2000.” The 8 
(for 80 million people) 7 (for the 7 years to the program ending year 2000) program set an 
objective to lift the 80-100 million remaining poor out of poverty by the year 2000. In this 
program, the Chinese government made a strong commitment to poverty reduction as well as 
education and health care. The number of poor people escaping from poverty rose to five million 
a year, compared with only 2.5 million in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Zhang, 1997).  
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Regional Poverty Differences in China 
The gains from past reforms were not distributed evenly among regions. There existed 
regional divergence and the poor in inland regions have gained very little during China’s high 
economic growth period (Chen and Ravallion, 1996; Diao, et al., 2003; Wang, 2004). Moreover, 
regional inequality has been enlarged over the past two decades (Kanbur and Zhang, 1999). With 
China’s entry into WTO, the poor inland regions may lag further behind if the Chinese 
government cannot develop and implement proper development policies. Thus the rural poor 
may increasingly concentrate in these regions (Diao, et al., 2003).  
Table 3.2 reports the poverty incidence rate at the provincial level in different years. As 
we can see from Table 3.2, there were eight provinces (Henan in Northern China, Shaanxi, 
Ningxia, and Gansu in Northwestern China, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan in 
Southwestern China) with a surprisingly high poverty incidence rate greater than 20% in 1985. 
Ningxia had the highest poverty incidence which was 53%. Meanwhile, there were seven 
provinces (Beijing and Tianjin in Northern China, Jilin in Northeastern China, Shanghai and 
Jiangsu in Yangze River area, and Guangdong in Southern China) with an almost zero poverty 
incidence. Most regions have seen significant improvement in their poverty situation over the 
past two decades. In 2001 only five provinces (Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Qinghai in 
Northwestern China and Guizhou and Tibet in Southwestern China) had a poverty incidence rate 
over 10%. Clearly, the highest poverty incidence regions clustered in the northwest and 
southwest.  
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Arresting achievements of China’s overall poverty reduction cannot mask the fact that 
pockets of severe poverty still exist in China’s rural areas, especially in central and western rural 
China. The spectacular economic growth in the coastal regions did not spill over to the poor 
inland regions. The poorer inland regions tend to grow more slowly than the richer coastal 
regions (Heilig, et al., 2005).  
Disadvantages and Advantages for the inland region in China 
Disadvantages in geographic conditions are usually considered as an important cause of 
poverty in the underdeveloped region (Diamond, 1997; Gallup at al., 1999; Sachs, 2001). Heilig 
et al. provided a comparison of selected characteristics between the poverty region and the 
non-poverty region at the county level in China. As shown in Table 3.3, over 72 percent of 
poverty counties on average are at slopes above eight degrees, in contrast to 36 percent of 
non-poverty counties. On average, poverty counties have a higher altitude and lower rainfall and 
temperature than the non-poverty counties have. Data in Table 3.3 shows that the poverty 
counties have much harsher natural conditions than non-poverty counties.  
As a result of the harsh natural conditions, agricultural productivity in poverty counties is 
much lower than that in non-poverty counties. For example, the average grain yield in poverty 
counties is 3,399 kg per hectare versus 4,896 kg per hectare in non-poverty counties. Basic 
infrastructure facilities (such as roads, telephone, water, and hospital beds) cover much fewer 
residents in poverty counties than in non-poverty counties. Poverty counties also have less 
educated human resources. The percentage of the illiterate population in poverty counties is as 
twice as high as that in non-poverty counties, while the percentage of population with a college 
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degree in poverty counties (0.19%) is as low as one fourth of that in non-poverty counties 
(0.75%). The low productivity and poverty status may reinforce each other.  
The geographical disadvantages of distance, altitude, landform, and climate, as well as 
the economic disadvantages (such as small market size, distance to market center, poor 
infrastructure) provides much of the explanation for poverty in China’s inland region. However, 
one should be aware that the inland region in China has very rich and excellent natural, 
humanitarian, ecological and protogenic resources. If the poor inland region in China can 
promote a development strategy based on these resources advantages, the inland region may 
have the opportunity to escape from underdevelopment.  
Official Institutional Structure of China’s Poverty Alleviation 
The State Council authorizes the Leading Group for the Economic Development of Poor 
Areas (LGEDPA) to coordinate poverty measurement and research, project planning and 
monitoring, and management of both domestic and international funding for poverty reduction. 
The anti-poverty executive agency and the Poor Area Development Office (PADO) report to the 
State Council via LGEDPA (see Figure 3.1). Within the Leading Group orbit, the State Council 
also funds four other anti-poverty units including the China Development Foundation for Poor 
Areas (DFPA), the Cadre Training Center (CTC), the Training Center Office (TCO), and the 
Economic Development Service Center (EDSC). After the central model, every province, 
prefecture and county has established their own Leading Groups and PADOs and many 
townships have a “designated person” to handle anti-poverty work. The Agricultural Bank of 
China, the National Planning and Development Commission, and the Ministry of Finance are 
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also intensively participating in poverty alleviation. In addition, many other agencies, enterprises 
and institutions at the central government and provincial levels are playing an active role in 
poverty alleviation in China (Zhang, 1997). 
Targeting of China’s poverty alleviation 
In order to make efficient use of limited poverty alleviation funds, the Chinese 
government designated some key national and provincial poverty counties and gave them special 
support. The initial list of key national poverty counties was announced in 1986 and included 
258 key counties in 17 provinces and autonomous regions. The basic selection criterion is that 
the average net income per capita of all rural residents within the county in 1985 should be less 
than 150 Yuan. However, among the 258 poor counties, only 83 counties met this criterion. 
another 82 counties have an average income per capita between 150 and 200 Yuan, and the other 
93 counties between 200 and 300 Yuan. This implies that the selection of key national poverty 
counties was highly political (Wang, 2004).  
The LGEDPA has adjusted this list several times since then. However, many counties 
strongly oppose being dropped from the new list because the selected key poor counties enjoy 
various allowances and access to resources. Therefore, few were removed from the list while 
many new ones were added. As a result, some “rich ” key national poverty counties emerge after 
they successfully escape from the vicious poverty trap. In 1994 The LGEDPA expanded this list 
to include 592 key national poor counties. The latest version of this list is the one readjusted in 
2001 which also includes 592 key national poor counties. However, the focus of this list shifted 
further to the central and western provinces. All the poor counties in the coastal regions listed in 
  38
1993 were eliminated from the new list. The provincial governments in these coastal regions 
need to take full responsibility for poverty reduction. 
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of these key counties and 74 counties of Tibet which are 
also included in the large-scale integrated government action to combat poverty. These key 
counties are concentrated in a poverty belt that stretches from the Northeast to the Southwest and 
from central China to the far western province of Southern Xinjiang. Among these 592 key 
poverty counties, 65% or 384 counties are in mountainous areas. 90% of the 55 minority-ethnic 
populations are in the poverty regions covering five minority autonomous regions, 24 
autonomous states and 44 autonomous counties. Minority-ethnic population accounts for 9% of 
China’s total population and 40% of national extreme poverty.  
Available evidence indicates that the selected key poor counties are slightly poorer than 
the national average. However, county-based regional poverty targeting is no longer efficient. 
First, key counties covered only 54% of the poverty population and 57% of low-income 
population in China2 (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998; Riskin, 1994). Second, some counties in the 
middle-income group are also designated as poor, which causes great resource leakage to the 
non-poor regions (Wang, 2004). Third, targeting funds for poverty alleviation purpose has not 
been well-distributed to these designated poor areas (Park, et al., 2002; World Bank, 2001). A 
survey in 1994 indicated that 30% of the poverty alleviation funding and the food for work 
funding from the central government, intentionally targeted to the 592 key poor counties, were 
directed to other places. Only 70% of the poverty alleviation funds and the food for work 
                                                 
2 The poverty line is 668 Yuan and the low-income line is 924 Yuan in 2004.  
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program and 60% of the funding to support underdeveloped areas reached the designated poor 
counties in 1994 (Pan, et al., 1995). Fourth, all the poverty alleviation funds from the 
government target the defined regions and projects instead of the poor populations.  
In order to target the poverty population more efficiently, China began to adjust its 
poverty targeting unit from the county level to the village level. In 2001 the Chinese government 
designated 148,051 poverty villages in total, 21.4% of all administrative villages. The central and 
western regions account for 88.4% of these designated poverty villages. The originally 
designated poverty counties account for 55.6% of the newly designated poverty villages.  
China’s poverty alleviation programs 
The Chinese government has made a strong commitment to poverty alleviation and 
implemented many poverty alleviation programs. As Zhang et al. (2002) pointed out, before the 
economic reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese central government was already heavily 
subsidizing through large direct budget transfers (Park, et al., 1996) and grain sold at preferential 
prices to farmers in poor regions (Park, et al., 2002). Since 1986, China launched a large-scale 
poverty alleviation program which included three main targeted poverty investment programs: a 
subsidized loan program administered by the Leading Group’s PADO and the Agricultural 
Development Bank, a Food-for-Work program run by the State Planning Commission, and a 
development fund program managed by the Ministry of Finance. 
The subsidized credit and loan plan for poor people is the largest poverty alleviation 
program in China. Since the beginning of this plan in 1986, the Chinese government has 
allocated about 68 billion Yuan of subsidized loans that are only allowed to be used in selected 
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“key poverty counties”. However, most of these poverty loans are misused to subsidize 
unproductive township enterprises and households with the ability to repay the loan. Only a 
small part of these subsidized loans reached the hands of poor people in need. As shown in 
Figure 3.4, only 16 percent of small loans reached targeted farmers in 2002. Infrastructure 
projects and agricultural industrialization projects account for a large share of the subsidized 
loans, 22 percent and 32 percent, respectively. 
The Food-for-Work program started in 1984 was aimed at improving the infrastructure 
conditions in poor regions. Before 1995, through this program, rural labor worked on road and 
irrigation projects during the off-farming season and the central government subsidized the 
workers through its overstocked grain, cotton, clothes, and other commodities. Since 1996, the 
central government budget took over this program and began to pay money rather than 
commodities to the workers. Until 2002, the Chinese government used 45.9 billion Yuan 
(including commodities paid before 1995 worth 16.9 billion Yuan) in the Food-for-Work 
program (Rural Survey Organization of National Bureau of Statistics, 2003).  
In 2002, the Food-for-Work program helped construct three million mu3  in basic 
farmland, improved seven million mu of farmland irrigated area, solved the drinking water 
problems for four million people and more than three million livestock, constructed 38,000 
kilometers of road in counties and villages, tackled the problems of water and soil erosion on 6.8 
million mu of land, and constructed more than five million mu of grassland. Basically, the 
                                                 
3 Mu is a Chinese unit of area. One mu equals to one fifteenth of a hectare.  
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Food-for-Work program helped the development of poor regions and increased the farmers’ 
income.  
Through the development fund program, the Ministry of Finance in China provides 
earmarked budgetary grants to local governments to fund a wide range of public investment 
projects in poor regions. The development fund program consists of four categories, among 
which two are coordinated by the national Leading Group for Economic Development in Poor 
Areas (LGEDPA) as poverty investments. These two categories include the Development Fund 
for Assisting Undeveloped Areas, which began in 1980, and the Three-West Fund, starting in 
1983. Through the former program, the Chinese government allocates 800 million Yuan each 
year to poor regions focusing on the old revolutionary base and autonomous counties of minority 
nationalities. Through the Three-West Fund program, the Chinese government allocates 200 
million Yuan each year to 47 counties in three northwest prefectures. Investments through these 
two programs did not increase significantly through the later 1980s and early 1990s, but they 
have increased dramatically since 1997 and even reached the funding level of the Food-for-Work 
program in the 2000s (Wang, 2002).  
  
3.2. China’s Foreign Trade and Poverty Reduction 
China’s economic center has changed over time. In early Chinese history, the southeast 
coastal region was uncultivated and sparsely populated. The Loess Plateau, the Yellow River 
Valley and Northwest, which are today’s poor regions, used to be China’s economic center. The 
historically famous Silk Route channeled China’s international trade through the northwest 
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corner of China. Over time, the southeast China became densely populated. After the Opium War 
in 1840, China was forced to open up several ports and further the whole country for trade. The 
coastal region began to play an increasingly important role as China’s economy was transformed 
through international trade and foreign direct investments.  
In 1949 the Communist Party of China under the leadership of Chairman Mao 
established a new government. During the first thirty years, China adopted a centrally planned 
economic system which favored heavy industries, and minimized trade and financial linkages 
with capitalist economies. Large projects invested by the government were mainly located in the 
northeast and other inland provinces, which were suffering from slow growth and outdated 
techniques. East China did not receive preferential policy supports.  
Before China’s economic reforms and open door policy, China was an insignificant 
player in international trade. The Ministry of Foreign Trade fully controlled China’s foreign trade 
and product-specific national foreign trade corporations (FTCs) conducted trade under a near 
total mandatory trade plan. In 1977, China’s total trade volume was only $14.8 billion, 
accounting for 0.6% of world trade (Fung, et al., 2002). Since 1979, China introduced a series of 
measures to reform its import and export systems and gradually rose to international importance 
in world trade. The share of China’s foreign merchandise trade in the total world trade exceeded 
2% in 1992 and kept on growing to almost 7% in 2005. Both China’s merchandise exports and 
imports increased at the same time, indicating that China has become a very important 
competitor and/or market to many countries in international markets.  
China has made great effort to integrate itself into the world economy over the past two 
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and a half decades. After 15 years of negotiations, China officially joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001 and became its 143rd member. Due to the size and 
potential of the Chinese economy, China’s accession to the WTO has significant impacts on its 
trade partners and the rest of the world. By accepting the rules and regulations of the WTO, 
China committed itself to open its market further and to level most of its trade and investment 
barriers within two to five years. China promised to cut its overall tariff level from 15.6% in 
2000 to 10% in 2008, the average tariff on industrial products from 14.7% in 2000 to 9.2% in 
2008 and the tariffs on agricultural products from 21.3% in 2000 to 15.1% in 2008 (Table 3.4). In 
practice, the tariff levels have been lowered more than the negotiated amounts. China’s market 
distortions have been reduced significantly over the past two and a half decades (Huang, et al., 
2005). In addition to tariff cuts, China also promised to allow foreign capital to gradually enter 
some industries, such as heavy industries, agriculture, finance and retail, which are still under 
protection.  
As a result of China’s accession to the WTO, China will greatly boost its trade growth in 
the future. This trend actually is confirmed by the available data over the years after China’s 
WTO accession. The trade growth rate after China’s WTO accession is much higher than that 
before its accession (Table 3.5). China’s trade grew at an annual rate of 11.7% in the 1980s, 
15.2% in the 1990s and 24.6% in 2000 to 2005. How will China’s international trade growth help 
reduce the poverty in China? If China’s trade liberalization over the past two and a half decades 
was the driving force to contribute to China’s poverty reduction, we can definitely be very 
optimistic about China’s poverty reduction in the future.  
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The World Bank argued that significant liberalization of China’s trade regime is a key 
element in reducing poverty in China. A closer look at China’s foreign trade may help us to 
understand whether such a relationship between trade liberalization and poverty reduction is true 
in China. There was a dramatic decline in China’s poverty incidence in the early 1980s, the first 
stage of China’s poverty alleviation. However, this largely preceded the country’s external trade 
reforms. Foreign trade did not increase much during the period of large poverty incidence decline. 
China’s poverty reduction pace came down during the second stage of China’s poverty 
alleviation (late 1980s), while China’s foreign trade kept on growing. In the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, China faces a big challenge to further reduce its poverty population 
significantly. In fact, China’s poverty population even increased 0.8 million for the first time in 
2003. This took place at the same time that China’s foreign trade was increasing at an annual rate 
of 24.6%. China’s poverty alleviation doesn’t seem to keep pace with China’s foreign trade 
growth.  
China’s regional trade pattern also shed some light on this relationship between China’s 
poverty alleviation and foreign trade. Table 3.6 shows China’s regional trade pattern in 2004. 
Four provinces (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong) accounted for 68.8% of China’s 
total foreign trade and 69.3% of China’s total exports in 2004. Guangdong province alone 
accounted for 31.5% of China’s total foreign trade and 32.4% of China’s total exports. These 
four provinces already had a very low poverty incidence in the early 1980s. It is a similar 
situation for other important trade provinces where trade is growing and the poverty levels are 
low. Thus, even though China’s foreign trade has increased dramatically over the past two 
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decades, the poverty intensity of trade (trade with poor countries and inland regions) has been 
very low. China’s regional trade pattern indicates that China’s trade liberalization is not a key 
element in contributing to its poverty reduction.  
Remittance on poverty 
Since the mid-1990s, a large number of farmer workers began to go to cities to work. In 
2001, the number of outgoing rural workers (who work outside their own town and village) in 
China was 78 million, accounting for 16.3% of China’s total rural workers. This unprecedented 
mobilization of farmer workers in China reached its peak at the end of 1990s. In recent years, the 
number of outgoing rural workers has remained high, but the rate of increase has come down. 
The majority of those outgoing rural workers come from the central and western regions which 
are generally poor and 80% of inter-province labor mobilization flowed into the Eastern coastal 
regions.  
The interregional labor mobilization from the central and western regions to coastal 
regions provides more job opportunities to the rural surplus labor, which helps to increase their 
income to some extent. However, the income of those outgoing rural workers generally was not 
high. According to a survey in 2001, the average monthly income was 583 Yuan and 83.6% of 
them had an income range between 200-800 Yuan (Ge, 2004). In terms of the annual income, 
57.1% of them had an annual income below 5000 Yuan and the averaged annual income was 
5532 Yuan.  
With the low average income, many of the rural workers in cities actually are another 
poverty group in urban areas in addition to regular urban poverty. However, these rural workers 
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in cities send a huge amount of remittances to their hometowns in central and Midwestern 
regions. In 2001, outgoing rural workers sent remittances in cash to Sichuan, Chongqin, Anhui, 
Hunan, Jiangxi and Guizhou amounting to 23.5 billion Yuan, 12 billion Yuan, 15.9 billion Yuan, 
12.3 billion Yuan and 3.4 billion Yuan, respectively. Remittances from outgoing rural workers in 
many provinces have outpaced their local fiscal income (Ge, 2004). Remittance in these regions 
play a very important role in poverty alleviation.  
Foreign trade increases in coastal regions may provoke the direct or derived demand for 
outgoing rural workers to these regions. Thus, one may conclude that foreign trade contributed to 
China’s poverty alleviation over the past two decades through remittance channels. However, one 
must notice that the large scale of mobilization of outgoing rural workers into cities started only 
after the mid-1990s, which is the third stage of China’s rural poverty reduction. Remittances may 
have played an important role in alleviating the rural poverty since the mid-1990s. However, it 
certainly did not contribute much to poverty reduction in the first and the second stage of China’s 
poverty alleviation history.  
In summary, China’s tremendous achievement in poverty alleviation is attributed to 
agricultural productivity growth roused from economic reform, varieties of poverty alleviation 
programs and the large scale of remittances coming from outgoing rural workers in cities. As 
China integrates itself into the world economy, China’s international trade has risen to a more 
important role in the international economy and it contributes to economic development in the 
coastal regions. However, China’s increased international trade is not found to contribute 
significantly to poverty alleviation in China, especially in poor inland and remote regions. As 
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China’s international trade increases further, positive impacts of international trade may spill 
over to the poor inland and remote regions if marketing conditions and other institutional 
environments improve significantly. Thus, it becomes an open question about how trade 
liberalization will affect China’s poverty alleviation in the future.  
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Figure 3.1: China’s Official Poverty line and rural poverty headcounts (1978-2002) 
Source: Wang (2004) and National Bureau of Statistics (2000-2004). 
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Figure 3.2: Official Institutional Structure of China’s Poverty Alleviation 
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Figure 3.3: Key Counties in National Poverty Alleviation Program in 2001. 
Source: Heilig, et al., 2005 
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Figure 3.4: Allocation of Subsidized Credits and loans for poverty alleviation plan in China in 
2002. 
Source: Rural Survey Organization of National Bureau of Statistics (2003) 
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Table 3.1: Poverty Incidence by Province (1985, 1993, and 2001) 
 Poverty Incidence % of national poor population 
Province 1985 1993 2001 1985 1993 2001 
North       
Beijing 0.0 0.55 0.53 0 0.03 0.06 
Tianjin 0.0 0.14 0.52 0 0.01 0.07 
Hebei 4.90 13.76 1.81 1.88 9.07 3.33 
Henan 24.90 12.59 2.1 13.68 11.92 5.64 
Shandong 2.30 5.83 0.7 1.24 5.18 1.56 
Northeast      
Liaoning 6.5 3.85 3.22 1.14 1.07 2.55 
Jilin 0.0 6.23 3.08 na 1.13 1.51 
Heilongjiang 14.1 5.22 4.55 2.08 1.2 2.92 
Northwest      
Inner Mongolia 10.6 10.75 13.3 1.17 1.9 6.28 
Shanxi 4.1 11.87 6.62 0.69 3.31 5.25 
Shaanxi 41.6 19.19 7.78 8.33 6.5 7.36 
Ningxia 53 29.53 13.6 1.34 1.31 1.8 
Gansu 43.9 26.15 9.6 6.03 6.2 6.64 
Qinghai 5 16.79 16.9 0.11 0.66 1.95 
Xinjiang 0.9 14.1 6.5 0.05 1.48 2.02 
Yangze River       
Shanghai 0 0.15 0 0 0.01 0 
Jiangsu 0 2.42 0.2 na 1.61 0.36 
Zhejiang 4.5 3.53 0.18 1.22 1.57 0.23 
Anhui 5.1 8.55 1.79 1.83 5.19 3.13 
Jiangxi 12.1 3.24 2.76 2.72 1.27 3.02 
Hubei 3.7 6.16 1.82 1.16 3.12 2.44 
Hunan 12.6 3.14 2.09 4.92 2.06 3.86 
South       
Fujian 6.3 1.14 0.24 1.16 0.37 0.22 
Guangdong 0 0.5 0.06 Na 0.34 0.14 
Hainan Na 4.67 1.72 Na 0.27 0.3 
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Table 3.1: (Continued) 
 Poverty Incidence % of national poor population 
Province 1985 1993 2001 1985 1993 2001 
Southwest      
Guangxi 22.2 7.82 3.35 6.08 3.72 4.62 
Chongqing Na Na 3.99 Na Na 3.33 
Sichuan 35.1 10.12 3.31 24.98 11.77 7.83 
Guizhou 36.8 21.85 10.4 7.72 7.9 11.12 
Yunnan 41.3 23.77 7.89 9.9 9.71 9.34 
Tibet Na 5.98 15.2 Na 0.15 1.13 
National Average 14.81 8.83 3.20 100 100 100 
Source: Wang (2004). 
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Table 3.2: Selected Indicators at County-level in 2001. 
Indicators
Non-Poverty 
Counties
Poverty 
Counties
Economy  
GDP (yuan per capita) 5,050.10 2,689.50 
GDP of primary industry (yuan per capita) 1,390.40 1,084.20 
GDP of secondary industry  (yuan per capita) 2,038.30 782.4 
Employment in tertiary sector (in % of all employed) 19.8 11.1 
Employment in secondary sector (in % of all employed) 15.8 4.9 
Government expenditures  (yuan per capita) 385.2 452.4 
Non-agricultural population (in % of total population) 24.3 11.7 
Education  
Student enrollment of secondary schools 
(in % of total population) 5.1 4.7 
Student enrollment of primary schools 
(in % of total population) 8.9 12.3 
Illiterate population (in % of total population age 15+) 9.6 20.7 
Population with no school (in % of population age 6+) 7.5 16.4 
Population with college degree (in % of population age 6+) 0.75 0.19 
Average years at school 7.5 6 
Demography   
Total population (in million) /1 1,057 211 
Population density (persons per km2) 787.6 144.6 
Ethnic Minority population (in % of total population) 10.7 39.3 
Rural population (in % of total population) 65.7 85.3 
Birth rate (birth per 1000 of the population) 11.6 15.6 
Natural growth rate (per 1000 of the population) 5.7 8.6 
Death rate (per 1000 of the population) 5.9 7.0 
Total fertility rate (TFR) (from 9.5% sample survey) 1.27 1.71 
Infrastructure   
Road length (m per km2 of land area) 99 68 
Hospital beds (per county) 737 451 
Hospital beds (per 10,000 of the population) 17.5 16.6 
Hospital beds (per km2 of land area) 0.71 0.2 
Households with telephone (in % of all households) 28.4 16.5 
Households without tab water (in % of all households) 5.3 7.4 
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Table 3.2: (continued) 
Households with bath facility (in % of all households) 2.3 0.8 
Households with WC (in % of all households) 6.6 5.9 
Agriculture   
Cultivated land (in % of total land area) 40.1 20.7 
Per capita cultivated land (hectare per person) 0.201 0.195 
Average grain yield (kg per hectare) 4,896 3,399 
Physical Characteristics (climate, topography)   
Slope above 8 degree % 36.1 72.2 
Slope above 15 degree % 29.2 60.3 
Slope above 30 degree % 14.6 29.3 
Average altitude (in meters) 566 1,633 
Average precipitation (in mm per year) 972 825 
Accumulated temperature (>10 degree celsius per year) 4,356 3,217 
Average temperature of warmest month in the area  
(degree celsius) 
29 25 
Average temperature of coldest month in the area  
(degree celsius) 
-7 -10 
Source: Heilig, et al., 2005 
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Table 3.3: National Government’s Investment in China’s Poor Areas by Program  
(billion Yuan), 1986-97. 
 Total Poverty Investment Development Fund Subsidized credit Food for Work
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
1986 4.1 3.9 1.0 0.9 2.3 2.2 0.8 0.7
1987 4.1 3.7 1.0 0.9 2.3 2.1 0.8 0.7
1988 4.1 3.1 1.0 0.8 2.9 2.2 0.2 0.2
1989 4.2 2.7 1.0 0.6 3.0 1.9 0.2 0.1
1990 2.7 2.8 1.0 0.6 3.0 1.8 0.7 0.4
1991 8.3 4.9 1.0 0.6 3.5 2.1 3.8 2.3
1992 6.7 4.9 1.0 0.6 4.1 2.3 3.6 2.0
1993 8.7 4.8 1.1 0.5 3.5 1.7 5.1 2.5
1994 11.7 4.7 1.1 0.4 4.5 1.8 6.1 2.5
1995 11.8 3.0 0.9 0.3 4.8 1.7 6.1 1.1
1996 10.1 3.2 1.3 0.4 5.7 1.8 3.1 1.0
1997 14.6 4.5 2.8 0.9 8.7 2.8 3.1 1.0
Total 93.1 46.2 14.2 7.5 48.3 24.4 33.6 14.5
Source: Zhang, et al., 2002 
 
Table 3.4: China’s Promise on Tariff Reduction 
Year Overall Tariff Level Averaged tariff of Industrial Products 
Averaged tariff 
of Agricultural Products 
2000 15.6% 14.7% 21.3% 
2001 14.0% 13.0% 19.9% 
2002 12.7% 11.7% 18.5% 
2003 11.5% 10.6% 17.4% 
2004 10.6% 9.8% 15.8% 
2005 10.1% 9.3% 15.5% 
2006 10.1% 9.3% 15.5% 
2007 10.1% 9.3% 15.5% 
2008 10.0% 9.2% 15.1% 
Source: People Daily Official website. Available at  
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/31/179/20020114/647339.html 
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Table 3.5: China’s Foreign Merchandise Trade in 1976-2005 
(US$ billion at current prices) 
 World China 
Year Exports Imports total Exports Imports    total % 
1976 992 1026 2018 6.94 6.66 13.60 0.67% 
1977 1128 1171 2299 7.52 7.15 14.67 0.64% 
1978 1307 1358 2665 9.96 11.13 21.09 0.79% 
1979 1659 1694 3353 13.61 15.62 29.24 0.87% 
1980 2034 2075 4109 18.10 19.94 38.04 0.93% 
1981 2010 2066 4076 22.01 22.01 44.02 1.08% 
1982 1883 1941 3824 22.32 19.29 41.61 1.09% 
1983 1846 1890 3736 22.23 21.39 43.62 1.17% 
1984 1956 2014 3970 26.14 27.41 53.55 1.35% 
1985 1954 2015 3969 27.35 42.25 69.60 1.75% 
1986 2138 2206 4344 30.94 42.90 73.85 1.70% 
1987 2516 2582 5098 39.44 43.22 82.65 1.62% 
1988 2869 2963 5832 47.52 55.27 102.78 1.76% 
1989 3098 3201 6299 52.54 59.14 111.68 1.77% 
1990 3449 3550 6999 62.09 53.35 115.44 1.65% 
1991 3515 3633 7148 71.91 63.79 135.70 1.90% 
1992 3766 3882 7648 84.94 80.59 165.53 2.16% 
1993 3781 3876 7657 91.74 103.96 195.70 2.56% 
1994 4325 4428 8753 121.01 115.62 236.62 2.70% 
1995 5162 5282 10444 148.78 132.08 280.86 2.69% 
1996 5401 5545 10946 151.05 138.83 289.88 2.65% 
1997 5589 5740 11329 182.79 142.37 325.16 2.87% 
1998 5499 5681 11180 183.71 140.24 323.95 2.90% 
1999 5713 5919 11632 194.93 165.70 360.63 3.10% 
2000 6451 6724 13175 249.20 225.09 474.30 3.60% 
2001 6184 6482 12666 266.10 243.55 509.65 4.02% 
2002 6484 6734 13218 325.60 295.17 620.77 4.70% 
2003 7572 7855 15427 438.23 412.76 850.99 5.52% 
2004 9191 9545 18736 593.33 561.23 1154.56 6.16% 
2005 10393 10753 21146 762.00 660.12 1422.12 6.73% 
Note: The figures are in US$ billion. Exports are valued on a f.o.b. basis, imports on a c.i.f. 
basis. 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics (http://stat.wto.org) 
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Table 3.6: Regional Trade, export and import value in 2004. 
 Total Trade Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
National 1154.6 1154.6 663.2 593.3 593.3 338.6 561.2 561.2 324.6
North     
Beijing 42.820 94.576 18.527 13.117 20.569 7.362 29.703 74.087 11.165
Tianjin 43.236 42.029 34.088 20.479 20.852 17.052 22.758 21.180 17.037
Hebei 15.280 13.526 4.260 9.710 9.339 2.657 5.570 4.186 1.603
Henan 7.355 6.620 1.221 4.400 4.175 0.704 2.955 2.445 0.516
Shandong 69.416 60.658 32.226 37.178 35.845 18.397 32.237 24.821 13.829
Northeast     
Liaoning 39.934 34.411 20.665 19.586 18.914 10.898 20.348 15.519 9.768
Jilin 7.487 6.790 3.521 1.917 1.715 0.505 5.570 5.078 3.015
Heilongjiang 7.183 6.789 0.763 3.720 3.681 0.381 3.463 3.110 0.382
Northwest     
Inner 
Mongolia 
4.375 3.722 0.272 1.887 1.354 0.155 2.488 2.367 0.116
Shaanxi 4.557 3.642 0.658 2.624 2.397 0.227 1.933 1.246 0.431
Shanxi 9.069 5.382 0.685 7.196 4.034 0.518 1.873 1.347 0.168
Ningxia 1.131 0.908 0.135 0.735 0.646 0.091 0.396 0.262 0.044
Gansu 1.964 1.763 0.167 1.036 0.996 0.126 0.928 0.777 0.041
Qinghai 0.648 0.576 0.010 0.462 0.455 0.004 0.186 0.121 0.005
Xinjiang 6.023 5.635 0.178 2.921 3.046 0.110 3.101 2.589 0.067
Yangze River    
Shanghai 156.799 160.010 107.232 69.731 73.505 49.488 87.068 86.512 57.743
Jiangsu 179.542 170.849 135.538 88.039 87.494 65.152 91.502 83.360 70.387
Zhejiang 94.659 85.205 32.626 61.153 58.139 19.651 33.507 27.070 12.975
Anhui 6.991 7.212 1.962 3.559 3.937 0.965 3.432 3.275 0.997
Jiangxi 4.818 3.528 1.156 2.608 1.995 0.529 2.210 1.534 0.627
Hubei 7.559 6.766 2.345 3.252 3.382 0.985 4.307 3.389 1.360
Hunan 6.082 5.444 1.069 3.144 3.106 0.503 2.938 2.337 0.566
South     
Fujian 49.847 47.527 31.166 30.551 29.395 18.419 19.297 18.153 12.748
Guangdong 363.354 357.131 226.530 192.411 191.571 121.711 170.943 165.575 104.820
Hainan 2.900 3.402 1.430 0.825 1.093 0.350 2.075 2.309 1.080
South West    
Guangxi 4.832 4.277 1.469 2.314 2.386 0.496 2.518 1.892 0.973
Chongqin 3.730 3.857 1.265 1.876 2.091 0.219 1.854 1.766 1.047
Sichuan 6.694 6.867 1.303 3.488 3.980 0.552 3.206 2.888 0.751
Guizhou 2.370 1.514 0.388 1.268 0.867 0.189 1.102 0.647 0.199
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Table 3.6: Regional Trade, export and import value in 2004 (continued). 
 Total Trade Exports Imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Yunnan 3.734 3.741 0.316 2.020 2.239 0.210 1.714 1.512 0.107
Tibet 0.165 0.200 0.004 0.119 0.130 0.002 0.047 0.070 0.003
Source: China’s Economic Information Website Online database (http://db.cei.gov.cn)  
Note: (1) indicates that calculation is based on commodities’ origin or destination;  
(2) indicates that calculation is based on firms’ location;  
(3) indicates the transaction conducted by foreign firms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR   
NEW CLASSICAL TRADE-POVERTY MODEL 
 
This chapter applies a new classical economic framework developed by Cheng et al. 
(2000) into trade-poverty analysis. We modify their 2X2 new classical general equilibrium model 
by assuming that two countries have different transaction efficiencies. From the perspective of 
division of labor, we examine how trade liberalization will affect the welfare of the poor 
developing country through comparative static analysis.  
 
4.1.  New Classical General Equilibrium Trade Model: Free Trade  
4.1.1. New Classical 2x2 Ricardian Model Under Free Trade 
Consider a developed country and a developing country, each with Mi (i = 1, 2) 
consumer-producers. Both countries consume only two goods x and y where we assume good x is 
capital-intensive and good y is labor-intensive. The rich developed country is assumed to have 
absolute advantage in producing both goods x and y over the poor developing country, while the 
poor developing country has exogenous comparative advantage in producing good y. Within 
each country, all consumer-producers are assumed to be ex ante identical 1 . Each 
consumer-producer has the following utility function. 
(1 )( ) ( )d di i i i i i iu x k x y k y
β β−= + +                                         (4.1a) 
                                                 
1 The assumption of ex ante identical consumer-producers seems very strong, since there doesn’t exist two identical persons in 
the real world. However, as Adam Smith indicated, many differences between specialists are ex post differences due to different 
occupation choices (Yang, 2001). 
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where xi and yi are respective amounts of good x and y produced for self-consumption, dix and 
d
iy are respective amounts of the two goods purchased from the market in country i, (1- ik ) is the 
iceberg transaction cost coefficient, and ik  is the exogenous trading efficiency coefficient 
which represents the regional conditions governing transactions. ik  is determined by 
infrastructure conditions, degree of urbanization, transportation conditions, communication 
conditions, general institutional environment and other factors. Although the transaction cost 
coefficient for each transaction is exogenous, the total transaction cost for each 
consumer-producer, and thus for society, is endogenous since the number of transactions is 
endogenized in our model2. The rich developed country is assumed to have higher trading 
efficiency than the poor inland region, implying 1 2k k> . For simplicity, we also assume a taste 
preference coefficient 0.5β = . 
Each consumer-producer’s production function and endowment constraint are as follows 
s
i i ix ixx x lα+ = , si iy y+ = iy iylα ,      (production function)            (4.1b) 
ix iyl l l+ =           (labor constraint)              (4.1c) 
where six and 
s
iy are respective amounts of the two goods that an individual in country i (i =1, 2) 
sells to the market; ixα and iyα represent the individual’s labor productivity in producing goods x 
and y in country i, individuals in the developed country are assumed to have absolute advantages 
in producing both products, thus, we have 1 2x xα α>  and 1 2y yα α> ; ixl and iyl denote the 
amount of labor allocated to the production of good x and y, and individuals in both regions are 
                                                 
2 A general definition of endogenous transaction cost is taken here that all transaction costs are endogenous if their levels can be 
seen only after individuals have made their decisions (Yang, 2001).  
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assumed to have the same amount of labor endowment (l) to allocate in their production.  
Each individual faces a budget constraint as 
s s d d
x y x yp x p y p x p y+ = +                    (4.1d) 
where jp  is the price of good  j (j = x, y). Hence, the left-hand side of (4.1d) is income 
from market sales and the right-hand side is expenditure. Allowing for corner solutions, we have 
the nonnegativity constraint as 
, , , , , , , 0s d s d x yx x x y y y l l ≥                     (4.1e) 
Under the above constraints, an individual makes decisions on what and how much to 
produce for self-consumption, and how much to sell to and to buy from the market. In other 
words, the individual chooses six nonnegative variables , , , , ,s d s dx x x y y y . Hence, there are 26 = 
64 possible corner and interior solutions3. For such a model, Wen showed that an individual will 
never simultaneously sell and buy the same good, never simultaneously produce and buy the 
same good, and never sell more than one good (Wen, 1998). This is called as Wen’s theorem. 
New classical economics denotes each individual’s choice of what to produce, to buy and to sell 
being consistent with Wen’s theorem as a configuration. Thus, the individuals can choose only 
from three possible configurations:  
Configuration of autarky (A) 
For configuration (A), an individual in region i is in autarky where he/she produces both 
goods x and y only for self-consumption. He/she does not sell any product to the market in 
                                                 
3 Because we assume different transaction cost coefficients for the two countries, the individual needs to decide the supply and 
demand level in each regional market. However, this will not increase the number of solutions. 
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exchange for another good for own consumption purpose. In another word, this individual’s own 
production of both goods are nonnegative but his/her market demand and supply of both goods 
are zero. Thus, this configuration can be defined by , , , 0i i ix iyx y l l > , d si ix x= =  0d si iy y= =  
and 1, 2i = .  
Configuration (P):  partial specialization in the comparative advantaged good.   
An individual in the rich developed country (i = 1) partially specializes in producing its 
comparative advantaged good x, which can be denoted as (xy/y)1 where he/she produces both 
goods x and y and sells good x and purchases good y from the developing country. This can be 
defined by 1 1 1 1, , , 0
s dx y x y > , 1 1 0d sx y= = . An individual in the poor developing country (i = 2) 
specializes in producing its comparative advantaged good y, which can be denoted as (xy/x)2 
where he/she produces both goods x and y and sells good y and purchases good x from the 
developed country. This can be defined by 2 2 2 2, , , 0
d sx y x y > , 2 2 0s dx y= = .  
Configuration (C): complete specialization in the comparative advantaged good. 
An individual in the rich developed country completely specialize in producing its 
comparative advantaged good x, which can be denoted as (x/y)1. This individual sells good x of 
his/her own production for good y from the developing country. This configuration can be 
defined by 1 1 1, , 0
s dx x y > , 1 1 1 0d sy x y= = = . The poor developing country completely 
specializes in producing its comparative advantaged good y, which can be denoted as (y/x)2. This 
individual sells good y of his/her own production for good x from the developed country. This 
configuration can be defined by 2 2 2, , 0
d sy x y > , 2 2 2 0s dx x y= = = . 
Each individual in both countries has freedom to choose any one of the above three types 
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of configurations and combinations of their configuration choices constitute a market structure. 
Consider there is a representative consumer-producer in each country and their configuration 
choice combinations constitute four possible market structures illustrated in Figure 4.1.  
For structure AA, all individuals in each country choose the configuration of autarky. For 
structure PC, the representative individual in the developed country chooses configuration P 
where he/she partially specializes in producing good x and the representative individual in the 
developing country chooses configuration C where he/she completely specializes in producing 
good y. For structure CP, the representative individual in the developed country chooses 
configuration C where he/she completely specializes in producing good x and the representative 
individual in the developing country chooses configuration P where he/she partially specializes 
in producing good y. For structure CC, all individuals in each country choose configuration C 
where he/she completely specializes in their comparative advantaged good.  
The general equilibrium of the world economy is defined as a resource allocation and 
trade network structure satisfying the following conditions:  
(a) Each individual maximizes his/her utility through choosing the consumption bundle 
generated by his/her production and trade decisions at a given set of prices with 
respect to configurations.  
(b) All markets clear. 
The individuals make their utility maximization decisions based on inframarginal 
analysis. That is, the individuals first choose the configuration of specialization and then make 
decisions on resource allocation for the chosen configuration of specialization and the constituent 
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market structure.  
In the neoclassical economics framework, interior optimum solutions are common and 
corner solutions are exceptional because of the dichotomy of pure consumers and firms. 
However, in the new classical economics framework, the interior solutions never take place in 
equilibrium (Yang, 2001). Thus, we cannot use standard marginal analytical methods in 
neoclassical economics to solve for a general equilibrium because of the existence of these 
corner solutions.  
Yang (2001) proposed a two step approach to solve for a general equilibrium in such a 
model. In the first step, we can solve for the corner equilibrium which consists of supply and 
demand functions of each good and the corresponding relative market price for a given market 
structure. There is one corner equilibrium for each one of four possible market structures. In the 
second step, we plug the corner equilibrium relative market price into the indirect utility function 
for each constituent configuration in a given structure and then compare corner equilibrium 
utility values across those configurations and the configurations in other structures. The 
comparisons across configurations in all specified structures are called total cost-benefit analysis 
which defines the conditions under which the corner equilibrium utility in each constituent 
configuration for a given market structure is a global maximum. This corner equilibrium is thus a 
general equilibrium within this parameter subspace. Therefore, we partition the parameter space 
into several parameter subspaces and identify the general equilibrium with each partitioned 
subspace.  
4.1.2. Solutions for the General Equilibrium 
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4.1.2a. First step: Solutions for the corner equilibrium with respect to a given market structure. 
Structure AA 
Individuals in both countries choose autarky configuration and their decision problems 
can be written as: 
0.5 0.5
, , , , ,
:
s d
i i i i ix iy
i i i
x x y y l l
Max U x y= ⋅                 (4.2a) 
s. t. i ix ixx lα= , i iy iyy lα=                     (4.2b) 
0s d s di i i ix x y y= = = =                        (4.2c) 
ix iyl l l+ =                          (4.2d) 
Substituting (4.2c) and (4.2d) into (4.2a), we have the unconstrained utility maximization 
problems: 
0.5 0.5( ) ( ( ))
ix
i ix ix iy ix
l
MaxU l l lα α= ⋅ −                    (4.2e) 
The first order condition with respect to ixl of equation (4.2e) is 
0.5 0.5
( 2 )
0
2( ) ( ( ))
ix iy ixi
ix ix ix iy ix
l ldU
dl l l l
α α
α α
−= =⋅ −                       (4.2f) 
Hence, we can have optimum amount of labor allocated to production of good x as  
1
2ix
l l=                              (4.2g) 
Substituting equation (4.2g) back into equation (4.2b), we have the production functions 
of both goods x and y as 
1
2i ix
x lα= , 1
2i iy
y lα=                       (4.2h) 
Substituting equation (4.2h) into utility function (4.2a), we have 
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0.5 0.5 0.5 0.51 1 1( ) ( )
2 2 2i ix iy ix iy
U l l lα α α α= ⋅ =                    (4.2i) 
Structure PC 
The decision problem for individuals in the developed country choosing configuration 
(xy/y)1 within structure PC is 
1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1 1
, , , , ,
: ( )
s d
x y
d
x x y y l l
Max U x y k y= ⋅ +                    (4.3a) 
s.t.  1 1 1 1
s
x xx x lα+ = , 1 1 1y yy lα=                          (4.3b) 
1 1 ,
d s x
y
py px p
p
= =                          (4.3c) 
1 1x yl l l+ =                            (4.3d) 
Inserting the constraints (4.3b) to (4.3d) into the utility function to eliminate 
1 1 1 1, , ,
d
yx y y l  yields the nonconstrained utility maximization problem as 
1 1
0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
,
: ( ) [ ( ) ]
s
x
s s
x x y x
x l
Max U l x l l k pxα α= − − +                 (4.3e) 
The first order conditions for utility maximization are 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
11
0.5 ( ) 0.5( ( ) )
0
s s
x x y x
s
k p l x l l k pxdU
Udx
α α− − − += =        (4.3f) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
1 1
0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ( ) )
0
s s
y x x x y x
x
l x l l k pxdU
dl U
α α α α− − + − += =         (4.3g) 
From equation (4.3f), we can derive 1
sx  as 
1 11 1
1
1
( )
2 2
y xs x x l llx
k p
αα −= −                  (4.3h) 
Substituting equation (4.3h) into equation (4.3g), we can have 
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1 11 1 1
1
1 1 1
( )
2 0y xx xx
y x
l lk pll l
k p
αα
α α
−− − + =               (4.3i) 
For convenience, let 1 10
1
x
y
k pp αα= , we can then express (4.3i) as 
1
1 0 1
0
2 0xx x
l ll l p l
p
−− − ⋅ + =                 (4.3j) 
Solutions to equation (4.3j) are 
0 1p =  and 10
1
x
x
l lp
l
−=   
Because the individual in the developed country produces both goods x and y, we have 
1xl l< . Hence, the only solution to equation (4.3j) is 0 1p = . That is, 
1 1
0
1
1x
y
k pp αα= =                         (4.3k) 
Therefore, we have the corner equilibrium relative price as  
1
1 1
y
x
p
k
α
α=                          (4.3l) 
We know that the marginal rate of transformation ( 1
1
y
x
α
α ) in autarky implies the price that 
an individual pays to produce more good x in terms of good y on his/her production frontier. 
Thus, the intuition here is that the relative price of good x with respect to good y discounted by 
transaction cost in the world market ( 1k p ) equals an individual’s marginal rate of transformation 
( 1
1
y
x
α
α ) in the developed country in autarky. Therefore, if 
1
1
1
y
x
k p
α
α< , an individual’s optimum 
decision is to choose autarky. If 11
1
y
x
k p
α
α> , an individual’s optimum decision is to specialize in 
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producing good x because the marginal utility of specializing in good x ( 1k p ) is higher than the 
marginal utility of producing good x in autarky. 
Substituting equation (4.3l) into equation (4.3h), we solve for the individual’s corner 
supply function for good x as 
1 1 1( )2
s
x x
lx lα= −                          (4.3m) 
By inserting this into the constraints (4.3b)-(4-3d), we solve for the corner solution for 
configuration (xy/y)1: 
1 1 1( )2
s
x x
lx lα= − , 1 112 xx lα=   
1 1 1( )y xy l lα= − , 11 1
1
( )
2
yd
x
ly l
k
α= −                  (4.3n) 
Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.4a), we have 
0.5
1 1 1( / ) ( )2 x y
lU xy y α α=                    (4.3o) 
An individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2 within structure 
PC produces only good y and sells good y in exchange for good x from individuals in the 
developed country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed as 
2 2 2
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2
, ,
: ( ) ( )
s d
d
y y x
Max U k x y=                    (4.4a) 
s.t.  2 2
sy y+ = 2 ylα                              (4.4b) 
2 2 ,
s d x
y
py px p
p
= =                         (4.4c) 
Substituting constraints (4.4b) and (4.4c) into equation (4.4a), we have the unconstrained 
utility maximization problem as 
2
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 2: ( / ) ( )s
s s
y
y
Max U k y p l yα= −                  (4.4d) 
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The first order condition with respect to 2
sy  of equation (4.4d) is 
2 2 2 2 22
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 2
0.5 ( ) 0.5
0
( ) ( )
s s
y
s s s
y
k l y k ydU
dy l y pk y
α
α
− −= =−                   (4.4e) 
Hence, we can solve for the corner supply function of good y of an individual in the 
developing country as 
2 2
1
2
s
yy lα=                           (4.4f) 
The equilibrium relative price p has already been solved in equation (4.3l). Substituting 
equations (4.3l) and (4.4f) into constraints (4.4b) and (4.4c), we solve the decision problem of an 
individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2 
2 2 2
1
2
s
yy y lα= = , 2 0x = , 1 2 12
12
x yd
y
k l
x
α α
α=                  (4.4g) 
Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.4a), we have 
0.51 1 2
2 2
1
1( / ) ( )
2
x
y
y
k kU y x l αα α=                      (4.4h) 
Markets of both goods x and y are cleared. By Walras’ law, we need to consider only the 
market of good x. The market clearing condition for market of good x is 
1 1 2 2
s dM x M x=                          (4.5a) 
Substituting optimum corner solution of 1
sx and 2
dx , we can obtain the optimum amount of 
labor which an individual in the developed country allocates into production of good x as 
1 2 2
1
1 12 2
y
x
y
k Mll l
M
α
α= +                            (4.5b) 
Structure CP 
In structure CP, the corner equilibrium relative market price is determined by the 
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developing country producing both goods x and y. An individual in the developing country 
choose configuration (xy/x)2 within structure CP where he/she produces both goods x and y and 
sells good y in exchange for good x from individuals in the developed country. The individual’s 
decision problem can be expressed as follows 
2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 2
, , , , ,
: ( ) ( )
d s
x y
d
x x y y l l
Max U x k x y= +                 (4.6a) 
s.t.  2 2 2x xx lα= , 2 2 2 2s y yy y lα+ =                          (4.6b) 
2 2 ,
s d x
y
py px p
p
= =                         (4.6c) 
2 2x yl l l+ =                           (4.6d) 
Substituting constraints (4.6b) to (4.6d) into equation (4.6a) to eliminate 2 2 2 2, , ,
d
yx x y l , 
we have the unconstrained utility maximization problem 
2 2
0.5 0.52 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
,
: ( ( ) ) ( )
s
y
s
s
x y y y
y l
k yMax U l l l y
p
α α= − + −                       (4.6e) 
The first order conditions for this unconstrained utility maximization are 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2
2 2
0.5 ( )
0.5( ( ) )
0
s s
y y
x y
s
k l y k yl l
dU p p
dy U
α α− − − +
= =                     (4.6f) 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2
0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ( ) )
0
s
s
x y y y x y
y
k yl y l l
dU p
dl U
α α α α− − + − +
= =                    (4.6g) 
From condition (4.6f) we have 
2 2 2 2
2
2
( )
2 2
y y x ys l p l ly
k
α α −= −                             (4.6h) 
Substituting equation (4.6h) into equation (4.6g), we have 
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2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2
( )
( 2 ) 0x y y yy
y x
p l l k l
l l
k p
α α
α α
−− − + =                           (4.6i) 
Let 21
2 2
x
y
pp
k
α
α= , then we have 1 0p >  and  
2
2 1 2
1
( 2 ) ( ) 0yy y
l
l l p l l
p
− − − + =                             (4.6j) 
Solutions to equation (4.6j) with respect to 1p  are 
1 1p =  and 21
2
y
y
l
p
l l
= −  
Because the individual in the developing country produces both goods x and y, we have 
2 yl l< . Since 1 0p > , the only solution to equation (4.6j) is 1 1p = . That is, 
2
1
2 2
1x
y
pp
k
α
α= =                                      (4.6k) 
Therefore, we have the corner equilibrium relative price as 
2 2
2
y
x
k
p
α
α=                                       (4.6l) 
Substituting equation (4.6l) into equation (4.6h), we solve for the individual’s corner 
equilibrium supply function for good y as 
2 2 2
1( )
2
s
y yy l lα= −                                   (4.6m) 
Substituting equations (4.6l) and (4.6m) into constraints (4.6b) to (4.6d), we solve the 
decision problem of an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (xy/x)2 as 
2 2 2( )x yx l lα= − , 2 22
2
(2 )
2
x yd l lx
k
α −= , 2 212 yy lα= , 2 2 2
1( )
2
s
y yy l lα= −    (4.6n) 
Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.6a), we have 
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0.5
2 2 2( )2 x y
lU α α=                          (4.6o) 
Within market structure CP, an individual in the developed country chooses configuration 
(x/y)1 where he/she produces only good x and sells it in exchange for good y from individuals in 
the developed country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed as follows 
1 1 1
0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1
, ,
: ( ) ( )
s d
d
x x y
Max U x k y=                   (4.7a) 
s.t.  1 1 1
s
xx x lα+ =                               (4.7b) 
1 1 ,
d s x
y
py px p
p
= =                         (4.7c) 
Substituting constraints (4.7b) and (4.7c) into equation (4.7a), we convert the constrained 
utility maximization problem into an unconstrained utility maximization problem as 
1
0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1 1: ( ) ( )s
s s
x
x
Max U l x k pxα= −                       (4.7d) 
The first order condition with respect to 1
sx of equation (4.7d) is 
1 1 1 1 11
11
0.5 ( ) 0.5 0
s s
x
s
k p l x k pxdU
Udx
α − −= =                        (4.7e) 
We solve for the corner equilibrium supply function of good x of an individual in the 
developed country as 
1 1
1
2
s
xx lα=                                     (4.7f) 
Substituting equation (4.7f) and equilibrium relative price equation (4.6l) into constraints 
(4.7b) and (4.7c), we can solve the decision problem of an individual in the developed country 
choosing configuration (x/y)1 as 
1 1 1
1
2
s
xx x lα= = , 1 2 21
22
x yd
x
k l
y
α α
α=                (4.7g) 
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Substituting the above solution into utility function (4.7a), we have 
2 1 2 0.5
1 1
2
1( / ) ( )
2
y
x
x
k k
U x y l
αα α=                 (4.7h) 
The market clearing condition for market of good x is 
1 1 2 2
s dM x M x=                                      (4.8a) 
Substituting optimum corner solution of 1
sx and 2
dx , as shown in (4.7g) and (4.6n), into 
equation (4.8a), we can obtain the optimum amount of labor which an individual in the 
developing country allocates into production of good y as 
1 1 2
2
2 22 2
x
y
x
M k lll
M
α
α= +                            (4.8b) 
Structure CC 
Within market structure CC, the corner equilibrium relative price is determined by both 
countries. An individual in the developed country chooses configuration (x/y)1 where he/she 
produces only good x and sells it in exchange for good y from individuals in the developed 
country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed the same as in equations (4.7a) to 
(4.7c). Thus, we can solve for the corner equilibrium supply and demand functions of an 
individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y)1  
1 1 1
1
2
s
xx x lα= = , 11 2
d xp ly α=                    (4.9a) 
Within structure CC, an individual in the developing country chooses configuration (y/x)2 
where he/she produces only good y and sells good y in exchange for good x from individuals in 
the developed country. The individual’s decision problem can be expressed the same as in 
equations (4.4a) to (4.4c). Thus, we solve for the corner equilibrium supply and demand 
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functions of an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2  
2 2 2
1
2
s
yy y lα= = , 22 2
yd lx
p
α=                 (4.9b) 
The market clearing condition for market of good x is 
1 1 2 2
s dM x M x=                                      (4.9c) 
Substituting optimum corner solution of 1
sx and 2
dx , as shown in (4.9a) and (4.9b), into 
equation (4.9c), we obtain the corner equilibrium relative price under market structure as 
2 2
1 1
y
x
M
p
M
α
α=                                (4.9d) 
Plugging the corner equilibrium relative price into equation (4.9a) and (4.9b), we have 
2
1 2
12
d
y
My l
M
α=                               (4.9e) 
1
2 1
22
d
x
Mx l
M
α=                               (4.9f) 
Substituting the corner equilibrium supply and demand functions into the utility functions 
for the representative individuals in both countries (equations (4.7a) and (4.4a)), we have 
1 2 1 2 0.5
1
1
( / ) ( )
2
x yk MlU x y
M
α α=                           (4.9g) 
1 2 1 2 0.5
2
2
( / ) ( )
2
x yM klU y x
M
α α=                           (4.9h) 
We summarize our solutions to all four corner equilibrium in the Ricardian model in 
Table 4.1.  
4.1.2b. Second step: Total const-benefit analysis on each corner equilibrium  
Now we carry out the total benefit-cost analysis on each corner equilibrium in order to 
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identify the parameter subspace within which the corner equilibrium is the general equilibrium. 
A general equilibrium is a corner equilibrium that individuals maximize their utility in their 
chosen configuration under the corner equilibrium relative prices.  
Structure PC  
Structure PC is the general equilibrium structure if and only if the following three 
conditions hold. First, under the corner equilibrium relative price in this structure 1
1 1
y
x
p
k
α
α= , 
individuals in the developed country prefer configuration (xy/y)1 to the alternatives, namely 
configuration (x/y)1 and configuration (y/x)1. Thus, we have 
1 1( / ) ( / )U xy y U x y≥                 (4.10a) 
1 1( / ) ( / )U xy y U y x≥                 (4.10b) 
From equations (4.7f), (4.7b) and (4.7c), we know that the demand and supply functions 
for an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y) are 
1 1 1
1
2
s
xx x lα= = , 1 112
d
xy p lα=              (4.10c) 
Substituting equation (4.10c) into utility function (4.7a), we can have the utility function 
for an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y) as 
0.5
1 1 1
1( / ) ( )
2 x
U x y l k pα=                (4.10d) 
Under the corner equilibrium relative price 1
1 1
y
x
p
k
α
α= , we have the utility function as 
0.5
1 1 1( / ) ( )2 x y
lU x y α α=                  (4.10e) 
Inserting equations (4.10e) and (4.3o) into (4.10a), we have 
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0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1 1 1( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )2 2x y x y
l lU xy y U x yα α α α= ≥ =           (4.10f) 
This is always true.  
For an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (y/x)1, the decision 
problem can be expressed in the same way as in equation systems (4.4a) to (4.4c) except 
changing the subscript i  from 2i =  to 1i = . Thus, we have the corner solution as 
1 1 1
1
2
s
yy y lα= = , 1 112
d
yx lp
α= , 1 0.511( / ) ( )2
yl kU y x
p
α=         (4.10g) 
Substitution of the corner equilibrium relative price 1
1 1
y
x
p
k
α
α= in this structure PC yields  
0.51
1 1 1( / ) ( )2 x y
k lU y x α α=                (4.10h) 
Substituting equations (4.10h) and (4.3o) into inequality (4.10a), we have 
0.5 0.51
1 1 1 1 1 1( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )2 2x y x y
k llU xy y U y xα α α α= ≥ =         (4.10i) 
This inequality holds iff 1 1k ≤  which is our assumption about the transaction efficiency. 
Second, individuals in the developing country prefer configuration (y/x) to the 
alternatives, that is, 
2 2( / ) ( )U y x U A≥                  (4.11a) 
2 2( / ) ( / )U y x U x y≥                  (4.11b) 
Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.4h) into inequality (4.11a), we have 
0.5 0.5 0.51 1 2
2 2 2 2 2
1
1 1( / ) ( ) ( )
2 2
x
y x y
y
k kU y x l U A lαα α αα= ≥ =         (4.11c) 
This holds if and only if  
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1 2
1 2
1 2
y x
x y
k k
α α
α α≥                    (4.11d) 
Otherwise, the individual in the developing country will choose configuration (A) if 
1 2
1 2
1 2
y x
x y
k k
α α
α α≤  
Combining this result with the assumption that 2 10 1k k≤ ≤ ≤ , inequality (4.11d) implies 
that 
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
y x
x y
k k k k
α α
α α≥ ≥ ≥                  (4.11e) 
For an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (x/y)2, the decision 
problem can be expressed in the same way as in equation systems (4.7a) to (4.7c) except 
changing the subscript i  from 1i =  to 2i = . Similar to equation (4.10d), we have the corner 
equilibrium utility function as 
0.5
2 2 2
1( / ) ( )
2 x
U x y l k pα=                (4.11f) 
Under the corner equilibrium relative price 1
1 1
y
x
p
k
α
α= , we have the utility function as 
2 1 0.5
2 2
1 1
1( / ) ( )
2
y
x
x
k
U x y l
k
αα α=                 (4.11g) 
Inserting equations (4.2i) and (4.11g) into (4.11b), we have 
2 10.5 0.51 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )
2 2
yx
y x
y x
kk kU y x l U x y l
k
ααα αα α= ≥ =         (4.11h) 
This holds if and only if  
1 2
1
1 2
y x
x y
k
α α
α α≥                     (4.11i) 
  79
Third, no individual in country 1 is completely specialized in good x, i.e., 
1 1xl <                       (4.12a) 
Substituting equation (4.5b) into the above inequality, we have 
1 2 2
1
1 1
1
2 2
y
x
y
k Mll l
M
α
α= + <                     (4.12b) 
This holds true if and only if  
1 1
1
2 2
y
y
M
k
M
α
α<                     (4.12c) 
In order to have inequality (4.11h) and (4.12c) hold true at the same time, we have 
21
2 1
x
x
M
M
α
α>                     (4.12d) 
Inequalities (4.10f), (4.10i), (4.11d), (4.11i), (4.12c) and (4.12d) define a parameter 
subspace as 
1 1 1 2
1 1 2
2 2 1 2
min(1, )y y x
y x y
M
k k k
M
α α α
α α α> ≥ ≥ , 
1 2
2
1 2
y x
x y
k
α α
α α≥ , 
21
2 1
x
x
M
M
α
α>         (4.12e) 
Within this parameter subspace, structure PC is the general equilibrium.  
Structure CP 
Structure CP is the general equilibrium structure if and only if the following three 
conditions hold. First, under the corner equilibrium relative price in this structure 2 2
2
y
x
k
p
α
α= , 
individuals in the developed country prefer configuration (x/y)1 to the alternatives, namely 
configuration (A)1 and configuration (y/x)1. Thus, we have 
1 1( / ) ( )U x y U A≥                  (4.13a) 
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1 1( / ) ( / )U x y U y x≥                  (4.13b) 
Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.7h) into inequality (4.13a), we have 
2 1 2 0.5 0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1( / ) ( ) ( )
2 2
y
x x y
x
k k
U x y l U A l
αα α αα= ≥ =         (4.13c) 
This holds true if and only if 
1 2
1 2
1 2
y x
x y
k k
α α
α α≥                    (4.13d) 
Otherwise, the individual in the developed country will choose configuration (A) if 
1 2
1 2
1 2
y x
x y
k k
α α
α α≤  
Combining this result with the assumption of 2 10 1k k≤ ≤ ≤ , inequality (4.13d) implies 
that 
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
y x
x y
k k k k
α α
α α≥ ≥ ≥                  (4.13e) 
From equation (4.10g), we know that 
1 0.51
1( / ) ( )2
yl kU y x
p
α=                   (4.13f) 
Under the corner equilibrium relative price 2 2
2
y
x
k
p
α
α=  in structure CP, we have 
1 0.51 2
1
2 2
( / ) ( )
2
y x
y
l kU y x
k
α α
α=                  (4.13g) 
Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.13g) into inequality (4.13a), we have 
2 1 2 10.5 0.51 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
1( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )
2 2
y y x
x
x y
k k l kU x y l U y x
k
α α αα α α= ≥ =        (4.13h) 
This holds true if and only if 
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1 2
2
1 2
y x
x y
k
α α
α α≥                       (4.13i) 
Second, individuals in the developing country prefer configuration (xy/x) to the 
alternatives, namely configuration (y/x)2 and configuration (x/y)2. Thus, we have 
2 2( / ) ( / )U xy x U y x≥                 (4.14a) 
2 2( / ) ( / )U xy x U x y≥                 (4.14b) 
Substituting equation (4.9b) into utility function (4.4a), we have  
2 0.52
2 ( / ) ( )2
yl kU y x
p
α=                (4.14c) 
Under the corner equilibrium relative price 2 2
2
y
x
k
p
α
α=  in structure CP, we have 
0.5
2 2 2( / ) ( )2 x y
lU y x α α=                (4.14d) 
Substituting equations (4.6o) and (4.14d) into inequality (4.14a), we have 
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )2 2x y x y
l lU xy x U y xα α α α= ≥ =           (4.14e) 
This always holds true. 
Substituting the corner equilibrium relative price 2 2
2
y
x
k
p
α
α=  in structure CP into 
equation (4.11f), we have  
0.5
2 2 2 2
1( / ) ( )
2 x y
U x y k l α α=                 (4.14f)  
Substituting equations (4.6o) and (4.14f) into inequality (4.14b), we have 
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )2 2x y x y
l lU xy x U x y kα α α α= ≥ =          (4.14g) 
Hence, we obtain that  
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2 1k ≤                        (4.14h) 
Third, no individual in the developing country is completely specialized in good y, i.e., 
2 yl l<                       (4.15a) 
Substituting equation (4.8b) into inequation (4.15a), we have 
1 1 2
2
2 22 2
x
y
x
M k lll l
M
α
α= + <                  (4.15b) 
Hence, we can derive  
2 2
2
1 1
x
x
Mk
M
α
α<                       (4.15c) 
Inequalities (4.13e), (4.13i), (4.14h) and (4.15c) defines a parameter subspace as 
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
y x
x y
k k k k
α α
α α≥ ≥ ≥ , 
1 2
2
1 2
y x
x y
k
α α
α α≥ , 
2 2
2
1 1
min{ ,1}x
x
Mk
M
α
α<  
Within this parameter subspace, structure PC is the general equilibrium. 
Structure CC 
Structure CC is the general equilibrium structure if and only if the following two 
conditions hold. First, under the corner equilibrium relative price in this structure 2 2
1 1
y
x
M
p
M
α
α= , 
individuals in the developed country prefer configuration (x/y)1 to the alternatives, namely 
configuration (A)1 and configuration (y/x)1. Thus, we have 
1 1( / ) ( )U x y U A≥                  (4.16a) 
1 1( / ) ( / )U x y U y x≥                  (4.16b) 
Substituting equations (4.2i) and (4.9g) into inequation (4.16a), we have 
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1 2 1 2 0.5 0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1
1
1( / ) ( ) ( )
2 2
x y
x y
k MlU x y U A l
M
α α α α= ≥ =         (4.16c) 
Simplification of (4.16c) yields 
1 1
1
2 2
y
y
M
k
M
α
α≥                   (4.16d) 
Substituting the corner equilibrium relative price 2 2
1 1
y
x
M
p
M
α
α=  into equation (4.13f), we 
have 
1 0.51 1 1
1
2 2
( / ) ( )
2
y x
y
l k MU y x
M
α α
α=                 (4.16e) 
Substitution of equations (4.9g) and (4.16e) into inequation (4.16b) yields 
1 2 1 2 10.5 0.51 1 1
1 1
1 2 2
( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )
2 2
x y y x
y
k M l k MlU x y U y x
M M
α α α α
α= ≥ =       (4.16f) 
Simplification of (4.16f) yields 
21
2 1
y
y
M
M
α
α≤                     (4.16g) 
Second, individuals in the developing country prefer configuration (y/x) to the 
alternatives, namely configuration (A)2 and configuration (x/y)2. Thus, we have 
2 2( / ) ( )U y x U A≥                    (4.17a) 
2 2( / ) ( / )U y x U x y≥                    (4.17b) 
Substitution of equations (4.2i) and (4.9h) into inequation (4.17a) produces 
1 2 1 2 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2
2
1( / ) ( ) ( )
2 2
x y
x y
M klU y x U A l
M
α α α α= ≥ =           (4.17c) 
That is, 
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2 2
2
1 1
x
x
Mk
M
α
α≥                             (4.17d) 
Substituting the corner equilibrium relative price 2 2
1 1
y
x
M
p
M
α
α=  into equation (4.11f), we 
have 
2 2 2 0.5
2 2
1 1
1( / ) ( )
2
y
x
x
k M
U x y l
M
αα α=                (4.17e) 
Substitution of equations (4.9h) and (4.17e) into inequation (4.17b) produces 
1 2 1 2 2 2 20.5 0.5
2 2 2
2 1 1
1( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( )
2 2
x y y
x
x
M k k MlU y x U x y l
M M
α α αα α= ≥ =        (4.17f) 
That is, 
2 1
1 2
x
x
M
M
α
α ≤                                       (4.17g) 
Since we assume that 2 1y yα α< , inequations (4.16d), (4.16g), (4.17d) and (4.17g) 
defines a parameter subspace as 
1 1
1
2 2
y
y
M
k
M
α
α≥ , 
22 1
1 2 1
1yx
x y
M
M
αα
α α≤ ≤ < , 
2 2
2
1 1
x
x
Mk
M
α
α≥  
Table 4.2 summarizes the partitioned parameter subspaces and the corresponding general 
equilibrium structures. If the trading efficiency in the two countries are low enough such that 
2 1
1 2
1 2
x y
x y
k k
α α
α α< , the general equilibrium structure is autarky (structure AA). As the trading 
efficiency in the two countries increases, the general equilibrium will discontinuously jump to 
partial division of labor (structure PC and structure CP) and even the complete division of labor 
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(structure CC). If 2 1 2 11 2
1 2 1 2
,x y x y
x y x y
k k
α α α α
α α α α> > , 
1 1
2 1
2 2
y
y
M
k k
M
α
α< < , and 
21
2 1
x
x
M
M
α
α> , the general 
equilibrium will occur in structure PC. If 2 1 1 11
1 2 2 2
max( , )x y y
x y y
M
k
M
α α α
α α α> , 
2 2
2
1 1
x
x
M k
M
α
α >  
2 1
1 2
x y
x y
α α
α α> , and 
21
2 1
1y
y
M
M
α
α< < , the general equilibrium will occur in structure CP. If 
2 1 1 1
1
1 2 2 2
max( , )x y y
x y y
M
k
M
α α α
α α α> , 
2 1 2 2
2
1 2 1 1
max( , )x y x
x y x
Mk
M
α α α
α α α> , and 
22 1
1 2 1
1yx
x y
M
M
αα
α α< < < , the 
general equilibrium will occur in structure CC in which both countries choose to completely 
specialize in producing its advantaged good.  
One immediate finding is that the developing country must have a larger population size 
than the developed country has, that is 1 2M M< , in order to have the general equilibrium occur 
in structure CP and CC. The general equilibrium structure of division of labor is determined by 
their transaction efficiencies in both countries together. The lower transaction efficiency in the 
developing country tends to pull the general equilibrium structure toward the lower level of 
division of labor. The higher transaction efficiency in the developed country tends to push the 
general equilibrium structure toward the higher level of division of labor. This demonstrates the 
interdependency between the two countries and justifies that the developed country has the 
responsibility to help the developing country in order to benefit more from a higher level of 
division of labor. 
4.1.3. General Equilibrium Analysis  
All four corner equilibrium structures can be the general equilibrium structure within 
certain parameter subspaces. Marginal analysis in Table 4.1 shows that individuals’ utility (per 
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capita real income) in a country is proportional to its productivities in both sectors if a country 
chooses autarky. If a country chooses complete specialization in its comparatively advantaged 
good (the developing country in structures PC and CC and the developed country in structures 
CP and CC), individuals’ utility in this country is positively related to productivity in its 
comparatively advantaged good only instead of productivity in both goods. When a country 
participates only in partial division of labor (the developed country in structure PC and the 
developing country in structure CP), individuals’ utility in this country is the same as in the 
autarky. However, a division of labor may still evolve.  
Let’s examine the developing country in structure CP. As the transaction efficiency in the 
developing country ( 2k ) increases, the demand for good y from the developed country ( 1
dy ) also 
increases. Responding to the increased demand of good y, the developing country will allocate 
more labor from the comparatively disadvantaged good x ( 2xl ) to the comparatively advantaged 
good y ( 2 yl ) in order to increase the supply of good y. As a result, the division of labor evolves to 
a higher level and increases the gains from trade. However, individuals’ utility in the developing 
country remains the same because the developed country reaps all gains from trade.  
The relative productivity of the comparatively advantaged good ( 1
2
x
x
α
α ) and the relative 
population size ( 1
2
M
M
) between two countries may also induce the evolution of division of labor. 
The larger the relative productivity ( 1
2
x
x
α
α ), the more comparatively advantage the developed 
country has in good x. The demand for good y of the developed country ( 1
dy ) increases as the 
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relative productivity ( 1
2
x
x
α
α ) expands. To meet the increased demand for good y ( 1
dy ), the 
developing country will shift labor from the more comparatively disadvantaged good x to the 
more comparatively advantaged good y. In another word, 2 yl will increase. Such a shifting of 
labor increases the gains from trade, but all of them are reaped by the developed country. As the 
relative population size ( 1
2
M
M
) increases, the aggregate market demand for good y from the 
developed country, averaged by the population in the developing country ( 1 1
2
dM y
M
), increases. 
Consequently, the developing country will shift labor from the more comparatively 
disadvantaged good x to the more comparatively advantaged good y.  
Inframarginal analysis shows that as the trading efficiency and productivities in both 
countries improve, the general equilibrium market structure may discontinuously jump from 
structure PC (or CP) to structure CC. The country in partial division of labor switches to 
complete division of labor and the welfare in both countries increase correspondingly. 
Marginal analysis also shows that as trading efficiency is improved in the large country4, 
terms of trade deteriorate for the large country and improve for the small country. However, the 
deterioration in terms of trade does not necessarily lead to a decrease in per capita real income in 
the country. Take structure CP as an example, the developing country (large country) produces 
both goods x and y and sells good y for good x from the developed country (small country). As 
trading efficiencies are improved in both countries, terms of trade for the developing country 
                                                 
4 Here a large country refers to the country who produces both goods x and y and determines the equilibrium relative price. 
Similarly, a small country refers to the country who produces only one good and takes the equilibrium relative price as given. 
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deteriorate because the relative price of good x to good y increases. However, per capita real 
income remains the same in the developing country and increases in the developed country.     
The inframarginal comparative statics even show that per capita real income may 
increase regardless of the deterioration in terms of trade. Suppose that the initial general 
equilibrium structure is CP where the developing country determines the relative price at 
2 2
2
y
x
k
p
α
α= . As the trading efficiency is improved in both countries, the general equilibrium may 
discontinuously jump from structure CP to structure CC where the relative price is 2 2
1 1
' y
x
M
p
M
α
α= . 
Under the given parameter subspace where structure CP is the general equilibrium, we have 
2 2
2
1 1
x
x
Mk
M
α
α<  and thus
2 2 2 2
2 1 1
'y y
x x
k M
p p
M
α α
α α= < = . The relative price of good x to good y 
increases, so the terms of trade have deteriorated for the developing country as the general 
equilibrium structure switches from structure CP to structure PC. Yet we observe that per capita 
real income in the developing country increases in moving from structure CP to structure CC. 
Therefore, as trading efficiency is improved under the given parameter subspace, the per capita 
real income in the developing country may even increase regardless of the deterioration in terms 
of trade. 
We can illustrate the market structures and their associated aggregate production 
schedules using Figure 4.2. Line AB and CD represent the production schedules of the developed 
country and the developing country, respectively. Point G (E) indicates the aggregate production 
level if both countries choose to completely specialize in producing good x (good y) and line EG 
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is the aggregate production schedules of both countries if autarky is the general equilibrium. 
Point H denotes market structure C that both countries completely specialize in producing their 
comparative advantaged good and trade with each other. Line EH represents market structure PC 
and line HG represents market structure CP. Triangle EHG represents the increased aggregate 
production based on specialization and division of labor compared to the autarky economy. As 
trading efficiency is improved, the equilibrium aggregate productivity will discontinuously jump 
from line EG to line EHG.  
This is aggregate productivity gain from division of labor. Even though under the 
constant return to scale technology, such as our Ricardian production technology, aggregate 
productivity can still increase as production specialization and division of labor increase. Yang 
defines this increased aggregate production as economies of division of labor (Yang, 2001).  
This is similar to the gain analysis in traditional trade theory. The difference here is that in our 
new classical economics model we have corner equilibriums as general equilibriums by allowing 
for corner solutions. Thus, the general equilibrium may not necessarily lead to a single stable 
equilibrium.  
 
4.2. New Classical General Equilibrium Trade Model: Introduction of Tariff 
Each individual country is more concerned more about its share of the gain accrued rather 
than the aggregate productivity gain to the international society. Even though there exist 
aggregate productivity gains from division of labor and free trade, these two countries may not 
necessarily choose to have free trade. As we can see from Table 4.1, the gains from division of 
  90
labor are distributed unequally. With the improvement of trading efficiency, the general market 
equilibrium switches from the autarky structure to structure PC (CP). The developed (developing) 
country receives no gain from production specialization and division of labor in moving from 
structure AA to structure PC (CP). All the gains from trade go to the other country. Thus, the 
developed (developing) country may have incentives to impose some trade policy instruments, 
such as a tariff, to grab some gains or a larger share of gains.  
Suppose country i (i =1, 2) imposes an ad valorem tariff, it , on the imported good and 
then transfers the tariff revenue evenly to all its residents. We further assume that only iμ  
percent of the total tariff revenue in country i is transferred to individuals. In other words, iμ  
indicates the transfer efficiency of tariff revenues where 0 1iμ≤ ≤ . If iμ < 1, tariff revenue may 
either be used for governmental administration purposes or be dissipated due to government 
corruption and rent-seeking activities. If iμ = 1, tariff revenue in country i is fully transferred to 
its residents. For simplicity, we solve for the corner solutions for each possible market structure 
only for iμ = 0 and iμ = 1. The following calculation are presented for iμ = 1. 
Structure PC 
Individuals in the developed country choose configuration (xy/y)1 and their decision 
problem is:  
1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1 1
, , , , ,
: ( )
s d
x y
d
x x y y l l
Max U x y k y= ⋅ +                    (4.18a) 
s.t.  1 1 1 1
s
x xx x lα+ = , 1 1 1y yy lα=                           (4.18b) 
1 1x yl l l+ =                          (4.18c) 
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1 1 1 1(1 )
d s
y xt p y p x R+ = +               (4.18d)    
where 1R  is the transfer payment from tariff revenues received by residents in the 
developed country. The transfer payment equation is 
1 1 1
d
yR t p y=                          (4.18e) 
In equilibrium, the post-tariff price of good x with respect to good y discounted by the 
transaction cost in the world market ( 1
11
k p
t+ ) equals the marginal rate of transformation (
1
1
y
x
α
α ). If 
1
11
k p
t+  < 
1
1
y
x
α
α , an individual’s optimum decision is to choose autarky because the marginal utility 
of specializing in producing good x is lower than the marginal utility of producing both goods in 
autarky. If 1
11
k p
t+  > 
1
1
y
x
α
α , an individual’s optimum decision is to specialize in production of 
good x. Thus, we have the corner equilibrium price as  
1 1
1 1
(1 ) y
x
t
p
k
α
α
+=                      (4.18f) 
From equations (4.18d), we have  
1 1
1
1 11 (1 )
s
d
y
px Ry
t t p
= ++ +                  (4.18g) 
Substituting equations (4.18b), (4.18c) and (4.18g) into the utility equation (4.18a), we 
have 
0.5 0.51 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( ( ) )
(1 ) (1 )
s
s
x x y x
y
k px k RU l x l l
t t p
α α= − ⋅ − + ++ +         (4.18h) 
The first order condition with respect to 1
sx , 1
1
0s
dU
dx
=  is 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
1 11
0.5 ( ) 0.5( ( ) / )
0
(1 )
s s
x x y x y
s
k p l x l l k px k R pdU
U tdx
α α− − − + += =+      (4.18i) 
Validating at 1 1 1
d
yR t p y= , we have 
1 1
1
1
(2 )
2
s x xl lx
t
α −= +                          (4.18j) 
Substituting equations (4.18e) and (4.18j) into equation (4.18g), we have 
1 1 1
1
1 1
(1 )(2 )
(2 )
x yd t l ly
t k
α+ −= +                (4.18k) 
Substitution of equation (4.18j) into equation (4.18b) yields 
1 1
1 1
12
x
x
l t lx
t
α += +                            (4.18l) 
Substituting equations (4.18j) through (4.18l) into utility function (4.18a), we have 
0.51 1
1 1 1
1
( / ) ( )
2
x
x y
l t lU xy y
t
α α+= +                   (4.18m) 
Individuals in the developing country choose configuration (y/x)2 and their decision 
problem is 
2 2 2
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2
, ,
: ( ) ( )
s d
d
y y x
Max U k x y=                   (4.19a) 
s.t.  2 2 2
s
yy y lα+ =                     (4.19b) 
2 2 2 2(1 )
s d
y xp y R t p x+ = +                   (4.19c) 
2 2 2
d
xR t p x=                      (4.19d) 
The equilibrium relative price is determined by the developed country at  
1 1
1 1
(1 ) yx
y x
tpp
p k
α
α
+= =                    (4.19e) 
From equation (4.19c) we have 
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2
2 2 2(1 )
s d
y
Ry t px
p
= + −                         (4.19f) 
Substituting constraint equations (4.19b) to (4.19e) and (4.19f), we have the 
unconstrained utility maximization problem as 
2
0.5 0.52
2 2 2 2 2 2: ( ) ( (1 ) )d
d d
y
x y
RMax U k x l t px
p
α= − + +          (4.19g) 
The first order condition with respect to 2
dx , 2
2
0d
dU
dx
=  is 
2 1 2 12
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 12
2 2 1 2 10.5 0.52
1 2 2 1 2
1 1
(1 )(1 )
( ) (1 )(1 )
0
(1 )(1 )
( ) ( )
d
y d
x y y
y x
d d
yd
x y
y x
x t tRk k l k x t t
p kdU
dx x t tRk k x l
p k
αα α αα
αα αα
+ +− + − + +
= =+ +− +
   (4.19h) 
Validating at 2 2 2
d
xR t p x=  and the corner equilibrium price 1 1
1 1
(1 ) yx
y x
tpp
p k
α
α
+= = , we 
have 
1 1 2
2
1 2 1(1 )(2 )
x yd
y
lk
x
t t
α α
α= + +                      (4.19i) 
Inserting the above equation into equation (4.19f), we have  
2
2
22
ys ly
t
α= +                        (4.19j) 
Combining equation (4.19j) with equation (4.19b), we have 
2
2 2
2
1
2y
ty l
t
α += +                       (4.19k) 
Substituting equations (4.19i) and (4.19k) into the utility function, we have 
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2 0.52 1 2 1
2
2 1 1
(1 )( )
2 (1 )
y x
y
l t k kU
t t
α α
α
+= + +                   (4.19l) 
The market clearing condition for good x is 
1 1 2 2
s dM x M x=                       (4.19m) 
Substituting the optimum corner solution of 1
sx and 2
dx , as shown in equations (4.18j) and 
(4.19i), we obtain the optimum amount of labor which an individual in the developed country 
allocates into production of good x  
1 1 2 2
1
1 2 1 1
(2 )
2 2(1 )(2 )
y
x
y
t k M lll
t t M
α
α
+= + + +                  (4.19n) 
Structure CP 
As in the free trade case, the corner equilibrium relative market price is determined by 
the developing country producing both goods x and y in structure CP. Within structure CP, an 
individual in the developing country chooses configuration (xy/x)2 and the decision problem can 
be described as follows 
2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2 2
, , , , ,
: ( ) ( )
d s
x y
d
x x y y l l
Max U x k x y= +               (4.20a) 
s.t.  2 2 2x xx lα= , 2 2 2 2s y yy y lα+ =                        (4.20b) 
2 2 2 2(1 )
s d
y xR p y t p x+ = +                       (4.20c) 
2 2x yl l l+ =                              (4.20d) 
2 2 2
d
xR t p x=                               (4.20e) 
The corner equilibrium relative price is determined at 
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2 2
2 2(1 )
yx
y x
kpp
p t
α
α= = +                              (4.20f) 
From equation (4.20c) we have 
2 2
2
2 2(1 ) (1 )
s
d
x
R yx
t p t p
= ++ +                               (4.20g) 
Substituting constraints (4.20b) and (4.20g) into equation (4.20a) to eliminate 
2 2 2 2, , ,
d
yx x y l , we have the unconstrained utility maximization problem as 
2 2
0.5 0.52 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
, 2 2
: ( ( ) ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )s
y
s
s
x y y y
y l x
k R k yMax U l l l y
t p t p
α α= − + + −+ +            (4.20h) 
The first order condition with respect to 2
sy  is 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 22
0.5 0.52 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
0.5 ( ) (1 ) ( ( ) )
(1 ) (1 ) 0
(1 ) ( ( ) ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
s
s
y y x y
x
s s
s
x y y y
x
k R k yk l y t p l l
t p t pU
y k R k yt p l l l y
t p t p
α α
α α
− − + − + ++ +∂ = =∂ + − + + −+ +
   (4.20i) 
Validating (4.20i) at 2 2 2
d
xR t p x=  and 2 2
2 2(1 )
yx
y x
kpp
p t
α
α= = + , we have 
2 2
2
2
(2 )
2
y ys l ly
t
α−= +                                 (4.20j) 
Substituting equations (4.20e) and (4.20j) into equation (4.20g), we have 
2 2 2
2
2 2
(2 )(1 )
(2 )
y xd l l tx
k t
α− += +                            (4.20k) 
Substitution of equation (4.20j) into equation (4.20b) yields 
2 2
2 2
22
y
y
l t l
y
t
α += +                                 (4.20l) 
Substituting equations (4.20j) to (4.20l) into utility function (4.20a), we have 
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2 2 0.5
2 2 2
2
( / ) ( )
2
y
x y
l t l
U xy x
t
α α+= +                              (4.20m)
  Within market structure CP, an individual in the developed country chooses 
configuration (x/y)1 and the decision problem can be expressed as follows 
1 1 1
0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1
, ,
: ( ) ( )
s d
d
x x y
Max U x k y=                     (4.21a) 
s.t.  1 1 1
s
xx x lα+ =                            (4.21b) 
1 1 1 1(1 )
d s
y xt p y p x R+ = +                       (4.21c) 
1 1 1
d
yR t p y=                             (4.21d) 
The corner equilibrium relative price is determined by the developing country at 
2 2
2 2(1 )
yx
y x
kpp
p t
α
α= = +                              (4.21e) 
From equation (4.21c) we have 
1 1
1
1 1(1 ) (1 )
s
d
y
px Ry
t t p
= ++ +                          (4.21f) 
Substituting equations (4.21b) and (4.21f) into equation (4.21a), we can convert the 
constrained utility maximization problem into an unconstrained utility maximization problem as 
1
0.5 0.51 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1
: ( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )s
s
s
x
x y
k px k RMax U l x
t t p
α= − ++ +                   (4.21g) 
The first order condition with respect to 1
sx of equation (4.21g) is 
0.51 1 1 1
0.5 1 11 1 11
0.5
0.51 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
0.5( )
(1 ) (1 )0.5 ( ) 0
( )(1 )( )
(1 ) (1 )
s
s yx
s s s
x
y
k px k R
t t pk p l xU
x k px k R l xt
t t p
α
α
++ +−∂ = − =∂ −+ ++ +
        (4.21h) 
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Validating the above equation at 1 1 1
d
yR t p y=  and 2 2
2 2(1 )
yx
y x
kpp
p t
α
α= = + , we have 
1
1
12
s xlx
t
α= +                                   (4.21i) 
Inserting the above equation into equation (4.21b), we have 
1 1
1
1
(1 )
2
xt lx
t
α+= +                                  (4.21j) 
Substituting equations (4.21d) and (4.21j) into equation (4.21f), we have 
1 2 2
1
1 2 2(2 )(1 )
x yd
x
k l
y
t t
α α
α= + +                   (4.21k) 
Substituting equations (4.21j) and (4.21k) into utility function (4.21a), we have 
1 2 1 2 0.51
1
1 2 2
(1 )
( / ) ( )
2 (1 )
yx
x
t k klU x y
t t
αα
α
+= + +             (4.21l) 
The market clearing condition for good x is 
1 1 2 2
s dM x M x=                                   (4.21m) 
Substituting the optimum corner solution of 1
sx and 2
dx , as shown in (4.21i) and (4.20k), 
into equation (4.21m), we obtain the optimum amount of labor which an individual in the 
developing country allocates into production of good y as 
2 1 1 2
2
1 2 2 2
(2 )
2 2(2 )(1 )
x
y
x
t M k lll
t t M
α
α
+= + + +                        (4.21n) 
Structure CC 
Within market structure CC, an individual in the developed country chooses 
configuration (x/y)1 and the decision problem can be expressed the same as in equations (4.21a) 
to (4.21d). Following the same procedure, we solve for the corner equilibrium supply and 
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demand functions of an individual in the developed country choosing configuration (x/y)1 as 
1
1
12
s xlx
t
α= + , 
1 1
1
1
(1 )
2
xt lx
t
α+= + , 
1
1
12
d xp ly
t
α= +               (4.22a) 
Within structure CC, an individual in the developing country choosing configuration 
(y/x)2 and the decision problem can be expressed the same as in equations (4.19a) to (4.19d). 
Following the same procedure, we can solve for the corner equilibrium supply and demand 
functions of an individual in the developing country choosing configuration (y/x)2 as  
2
2
22
ys ly
t
α= + , 
2 2
2
2
(1 )
2
yt ly
t
α+= + , 
2
2
2(2 )
yd lx
t p
α= +           (4.22b) 
The market clearing condition for good x is 
1 1 2 2
s dM x M x=                                    (4.22c) 
Substituting the optimum corner solution of 1
sx and 2
dx , as shown in (4.22a) and (4.22b),  
into equation (4.9c), we obtain the corner equilibrium relative price under market structure as 
1 2 2
2 1 1
(2 )
(2 )
y
x
t M
p
t M
α
α
+= +                         (4.22d) 
Plugging the corner equilibrium relative price into equation (4.22a) and (4.22b), we have 
2 2
1
2 1(2 )
yd M ly
t M
α= +                             (4.22e) 
1 1
2
1 2(2 )
d xM lx
t M
α= +                             (4.22f) 
Substituting the corner equilibrium supply and demand functions into the utility functions 
for the representative individual in both countries (equations (4.21a) and (4.19a)), we have 
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0.5
1 1 2 1 2
1
1 2 1
(1 )
( / )
(2 )(2 )
x yt k MU x y l
t t M
α α+⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
                    (4.22g) 
0.5
2 2 1 1 2
2
1 2 2
(1 )
( / )
(2 )(2 )
x yt k MU y x l
t t M
α α+⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
                       (4.22h) 
We summarize our solutions to all four corner equilibriums in the Ricardian model in 
Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 shows that when a structure with partial division of labor (structure PC or CP) 
is the general equilibrium structure, the relative price is determined by the country producing 
both goods x and y. For instance, in market structure CP, the developing country (country 2) 
determines the relative price of Px with respect to Py as 2 2
2 2(1 )
yx
y x
kPp
P t
α
α= = + . Since the 
developing country exports its comparatively advantaged good y and imports its comparatively 
disadvantaged good x, the terms of trade for the developing country ( y
x
P
P
) will deteriorate as the 
trading efficiency (k2) increases, the relative productivity between two countries’ comparatively 
advantaged goods ( 2
2
y
x
α
α ) increases, and the tariff rate decreases. The terms of trade for the 
developed country will move in the opposite direction responding to the same parameter changes 
in the developing country and will not respond to any change in its own economic system.  
If the market structure with complete division of labor (structure CC) is the general 
equilibrium structure, the general equilibrium relative price is determined by both countries at 
1 2 2
2 1 1
(2 )
(2 )
yx
y x
t Mpp
p t M
α
α
+= = + . The terms of trade for the developing country (
y
x
P
P
) will improve as the 
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relative population size ( 2
1
M
M
) and the relative productivity of the comparatively advantaged 
sector ( 2
1
y
x
α
α ) decrease, the tariff rate in the developed country ( 1t ) decreases and the tariff rate in 
the developing country ( 2t ) increases.  
However, deterioration in terms of trade of one country does not necessarily indicate 
welfare loss in that country. We can take the derivative of the utility functions with respect to the 
tariff rate from Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Because the expressions of the derivatives are complex, 
we only report the signs of the derivatives in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 showing the welfare 
impacts of tariff rate in both countries for 1iμ =  and 0iμ = . For 1iμ = , our results indicate 
that individuals in the both countries obtain a higher utility level than they do in autarky if the 
general equilibrium occurs in a structure with some degree of division of labor (structures PC, 
CP or CC). Otherwise, individuals in both countries will choose the autarky configuration. When 
general equilibrium occurs at a structure with partial division of labor, the large country 
producing two goods can improve its residents’ welfare by raising its tariff rate, which can be 
seen that 1 1U t∂ ∂ > 0 in structure PC and 2 2U t∂ ∂ > 0 in structure CP. This is because the large 
country can determine the terms of trade by changing its tariff rate. Thus, its share of gains from 
trade will increase if it increases its tariff rate. However, this increase in gains for the large 
country is at the expense of its trading partner because 2 1U t∂ ∂ < 0 in structure PC and 
1 2U t∂ ∂ < 0 in structure CP. When the large country imposes a sufficiently high tariff, the small 
country may choose to withdraw from trade because gains from trade are overrun by losses from 
the tariff for the small country, in which case both countries get hurt.  
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In contrast to the large country, the small country only hurts itself and its trading partner 
by imposing a tariff, which is shown in Table 4.5, 2 2U t∂ ∂ < 0 and 1 2U t∂ ∂ < 0 in structure PC 
and 1 1U t∂ ∂ < 0 and 2 1U t∂ ∂ < 0 in structure CP. This is because the small country has no 
influence on the terms of trade.  
If the general equilibrium occurs in structure CC in which both countries can affect the 
terms of trade, both developed country and developing country will be better off by increasing 
their tariff rate given the tariff rate in trading-partner country, which can be seen that 
1 1 0U t∂ ∂ >  and 2 2 0U t∂ ∂ >  in Table 4.5. But in each case the welfare increase is at the 
expense of the trading-partner, which can be seen that 2 1U t∂ ∂ > 0 and 1 2U t∂ ∂ < 0 in structure 
CC in Table 4.5. Both countries may be tempted to increase their tariff rate to improve their 
welfare. But if one country increases its tariff rate too high, its trading partner may withdraw 
from trade to autarky, in which case both countries get hurt.  
The story is different if the transfer efficiency of the tariff revenue equals zero (μ1 = μ2 = 
0). In this case, welfare of individuals in the large country are not affected by tariff rate changes 
in both countries, 1 1U t∂ ∂ = 0 and 1 2 0U t∂ ∂ =  in structure PC and 2 1 0U t∂ ∂ = and 
2 2 0U t∂ ∂ =  in structure CP in Table 4.6. As the tariff rate increase changes the relative price, 
individuals reallocate their production and consumption so that they can stay on the same 
indifference curve. Since the government in the large country reaps the tariff revenues, the large 
country has incentives to increase its tariff rate. However, this tariff rate increase will hurt 
residents in the small country, 2 1U t∂ ∂ < 0 in structure PC and 1 2U t∂ ∂ < 0 in structure CP in 
Table 4.6. Tariff rate increases in the small country will hurt its residents’ welfare. Since the 
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government reaps tariff revenues, the small country may still have incentives to increase the 
tariff rate if the government weighs the tariff revenues more than its residents’ welfare.  
Table 4.3 also implies that as the transaction efficiency increases, the division of labor 
will increase and thus improve the welfare situation. Take structure CP as an instance, as the 
transaction efficiency in the developing country ( 2k ) increases, the amount of labor allocated 
into its comparatively disadvantaged good x by the developing country ( 2xl ) decreases and the 
amount of labor allocated into its comparatively advantage good y ( 2 yl ) increases. In other words, 
the degree of specialization and division of labor in the developing country’s comparatively 
advantaged good y increases. As a result of this increased specialization, welfare increases. We 
find that gains from increased division of labor to individuals hinges on the transfer efficiency of 
tariff revenues. As shown in Table 4.4, individuals in the developing country within structure CP 
do not receive any gain from increased degree of division of labor (increased 2 yl ) if the transfer 
efficiency of tariff revenues equals zero.  
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Figure 4.1: Configurations and Structures 
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Table 4.1: Four Corner Equilibria in the Ricardian Model 
Structure Relative Price Developed Country Developing Country 
AA n.a. 
1 1
1
2 x
x lα= , 1 112 yy lα=  
0.5 0.5
1 1 1
1( )
2 x y
U A lα α=  
2 2
1
2 x
x lα= , 2 212 yy lα=  
0.5 0.5
2 2 2
1( )
2 x y
U A lα α=  
PC 1
1 1
y
x
p
k
α
α=  
1 1
1
2 x
x lα= , 1 1 1( )2
s
x x
lx lα= −  
1 1 1( )y xy l lα= − , 
1
1 1
1
( )
2
yd
x
ly l
k
α= −   
0.5 0.5
1 1 1 1
1( )
2 x y
U U A lα α= =
1 2 2
1
1 12 2
y
x
y
k Mll l
M
α
α= +  
1 2 1
2
12
x yd
y
k l
x
α α
α= , 
2 2 2
1
2
s
yy y lα= =
0.51 1 2
2 2
1
1 ( )
2
x
y
y
k kU l αα α=  
CP 2 2
2
y
x
k
p
α
α=  
1 1 1
1
2
s
xx x lα= = , 1 2 21
22
x yd
x
k l
y
α α
α=
2 1 2 0.5
1 1
2
1 ( )
2
y
x
x
k k
U l
αα α=  
2 2 2( )x yx l lα= − ,
2 2
2
2
(2 )
2
x yd l lx
k
α −=  
2 2
1
2 y
y lα= , 2 2 2 1( )2
s
y yy l lα= −  
 
0.5 0.5
2 2 2 2( ) 2 x y
lU U A α α= =
1 1 2
2
2 22 2
x
y
x
M k lll
M
α
α= +  
CC 2 2
1 1
y
x
M
p
M
α
α=  
1 1 1
1
2
s
xx x lα= = , 21 2
12
d
y
My l
M
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Table 4.2: Parameter Subspace for Each Market Structure 
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Figure 4.2: Economies of division of labor based on exogenous technical advantages 
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Table 4.5: Per Capita Real Income Change in the 2X2 Ricardian Model: 1iμ =  
The Developed Country The Developing country 
Structure 
1 1U t∂ ∂  1 2U t∂ ∂  2 1U t∂ ∂  2 2U t∂ ∂  
PC + - - - 
CP - - - + 
CC + - - + 
 
 
Table 4.6: Per Capita Real Income Change in the 2X2 Ricardian Model: 0iμ =  
The Developed Country The Developing country 
Structure 
1 1U t∂ ∂  1 2U t∂ ∂  2 1U t∂ ∂  2 2U t∂ ∂  
PC 0 0 - - 
CP - - 0 0 
CC - - 0 0 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
  EXTENDED 3X2 NEW CLASSICAL TRADE-POVERTY MODEL 
 
In chapter four we analyzed the equilibrium structures and the welfare implications on 
the developing country in a 2X2 new classical Ricardian model. The impacts on the poor 
developing country can be considered as the poverty impacts of trade liberalization. However, as 
mentioned in chapters two and three, the poor in the developing country are often concentrated in 
remote and poor inland areas. The poor inland region may be far from being integrated with the 
rich coastal region. Thus, the welfare benefits from trade liberalization on the whole developing 
country may not necessarily be transmitted to the poverty region, where most poor population 
clusters.  
The coexistence of the poor inland region and rich coastal region in a developing country 
is parallel to the dual economy model developed by Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961) and 
others. Lewis’s dual economy model considers an ongoing move of labor and resources from a 
“traditional sector” to a “modern sector” critical to the economic development. Ongoing capital 
accumulation in the modern sector continuously provides incentives for the labor and resources 
movement. Expanding the labels traditional sector and modern sector to poor inland region and 
rich coastal region in the developing country, we extend our new classical trade-poverty model 
from a 2X2 two-country case to a 3X2 case. However, we focus the incentives for resource 
movements between regions on evolution of division of labor due to international trade rather 
than capital accumulation in the modern sector.   
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5.1 Extended 3X2 New Classical Trade-Poverty Model 
Suppose that a developed country (i = 1) has trade relationship with a developing country 
which is segregated into two regions—a rich coastal region (i = 2) and a poor inland region (i = 
3). The production functions in region i (i = 1, 2, 3) are assumed to be the same as specified in 
equation (4.2a) and that 1 2 3x x xα α α> > , 1 2 3y y yα α α> > , 1 2 3
1 2 3
x x x
y y y
α α α
α α α> > , i.e., the 
developed country (i = 1) has absolute advantages in producing both goods x and y and a 
comparative advantage in producing good x to the two regions in the developing country (i = 2, 
3); the rich coastal region (i = 2) has absolute advantages in producing both goods x and y and a 
comparative advantage in producing good x to the poor inland region (i = 3) and a comparative 
advantage in producing good y to the developed country (i = 1); the poor inland region in the 
developing country has a comparative advantage in producing good y relative to the developed 
country and the rich coastal region in the developing country. The transaction efficiency is 
assumed to have a pattern as 1 2 3k k k> > . 
If we view the poor inland region just as another independent country, the model is 
similar to the 3X2 Ricardian model with three countries and two goods developed by Yang 
(2001). With an assumption of the same transaction efficiency in all countries, Yang proved that 
it was possible that country 2 (same as the rich coastal region in our poverty model) would be 
excluded from trade within a certain parameter subspace. However, in our trade-poverty model, 
we assume that the poor inland region does not trade directly with foreign exporters but 
indirectly participates in international trade through the rich coastal region. This is a reasonable 
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assumption because the poor inland region usually has insufficient physical capital stocks, 
human capital resources, and infrastructure facilities (such as transportation and information 
technologies), which are necessary to the success of international trade. Thus, the rich coastal 
region plays a very important role in facilitating the trade relationship between the developed 
country and the poor inland region, rather than being excluded from trade.  
In general equilibrium a region will not specialize in producing its disadvantaged good. 
Thus, the developed country will choose only from three possible configurations: (A), (x/y)1 and 
(xy/y)1. The coastal region in the developing country will choose from five possible 
configurations: (A), (y/x)2 and (xy/x)2, (x/y)2 and (xy/y)2. The poor inland region in the 
developing country will choose from three possible configurations: (A), (y/x)3 and (xy/x)3. 
If the developing country takes a close-door trade policy, or imposes high enough trade 
barriers (including tariff and non-tariff trade barriers), the developed country may be excluded 
from international trade. The trade pattern is then reduced to domestic trade only and the 
equilibrium structures can be described by Figure 5.1. As shown in Figure 5.1, The trade pattern 
in equilibrium is similar to the two-country case in Figure 4.1 plus the developed country in 
autarky situation. Thereby we can apply the 2X2 new classical trade-poverty model established 
in chapter four to analyze how interregional (rather than international) trade policy and transfer 
payments within the developing country affect the poor. 
If the developing country takes a free trade policy, the poor inland region may be 
excluded from trade due to its higher transaction cost compared to the rich coastal region. The 
trade pattern can also be reduced to a two-country case; the equilibrium structures are described 
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of by Figure 5.2. Trade liberalization will only affect welfare of residents in the coastal region in 
the developing country, while leaving the poor inland region in autarky.  
If the poor inland region participates in trade under an open-door trade policy, the poor 
inland region in the developing country may not be able to satisfy the demand of good y in the 
developed country and the coastal region in the developing country, due to the low productivity 
in the poor inland region. The rich coastal region in the developing country also needs to supply 
good y to the developed country. Figure 5.3 illustrates the other three possible equilibrium 
structures in addition to the structures listed in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.  
Suppose all three regions participate in international trade and region i (i = 1, 2, 3) 
imposes an ad valorem tariff it  on the imported good and then transfers tariff revenues evenly 
to all residents in country i. Both regions in the developing country have the same tariff rate, that 
is, 3 2t t= . The transfer efficiency in each region is assumed to be iμ  ( 1,2,3i = ). We only need 
to solve for the general equilibrium structures listed in Figure 5.3. We can follow the same 
procedure as used in chapter 4 to solve for the general equilibrium. To avoid unnecessary 
repetition, we only show the calculation about the poor inland region. The presented calculation 
below is for 1 2 3 1μ μ μ= = = .  
Structure PCC 
Individuals in the coastal region of the developing country choose configuration (y/x) in 
structure PCC and their decision problem is 
3 3 3
0.5 0.5
3 3 3 3
, ,
: ( ) ( )
s d
d
y y x
Max U k x y=                    (5.1a) 
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s.t.  3 3 3
s
yy y lα+ =                      (5.1b) 
3 3 2 3 2(1 ) /
s d
y xp y R t p x k+ = +                  (5.1c) 
We use 3
dx  to denote the direct demand for good x from the coastal region and 3 2/
dx k  
the ultimate demand for good x of the inland region from the developed country. The transfer 
payment of tariff revenues is expressed as 
3 3 2 3 2/
d
xR t p x kμ=                   (5.1d) 
The equilibrium relative price is determined as 
1 1
1 1
(1 ) yx
y x
tpp
p k
α
α
+= =                   (5.1e) 
From equation (5.1c), we can have 
3
3 2 3 2(1 ) /
s d
y
Ry t px k
p
= + −                     (5.1f) 
Substituting equations (5.1b) and (5.1f) into utility function (5.1a), we have 
3
0.5 0.53
3 3 3 3 2 3 2: ( ) ( (1 ) / )d
d d
y
x y
RMax U k x l t px k
p
α= − + +              (5.1g) 
The first order condition with respect to 3
dx , 3
3
0d
U
x
∂ =∂  is 
3
3 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 2
3
0.5 0.533 3 3 3 2 3 2
0.5 (1 ) / 0.5 ( (1 ) / )
0
( ) ( (1 ) / )
d d
y
y
d d d
y
y
Rk x t p k k l t px k
pU
Rx k x l t px k
p
α
α
− + + − + +∂ = =∂ − + +
       (5.1h) 
Validating at 3 3 2 3 2/
d
xR t p x kμ=  and 1 1
1 1
(1 ) yx
y x
tpp
p k
α
α
+= = , we have 
1 2 1 3
3
1 2 1(1 )(2 )
x yd
y
lk k
x
t t
α α
α= + +                     (5.1i) 
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 Inserting equations (5.1d) and (5.1i) into equation (5.1f), we have    
3
3
22
ys ly
t
α= +                       (5.1j) 
Combining with equation (5.1b), we know that 
2 3
3
2
(1 )
2
yt ly
t
α+= +                      (5.1k) 
Substituting equations (5.1i) and (5.1k) into the utility function, we solve for an 
individual’s utility function in the poor inland region as 
0.5
3 2 1 2 3 1
3
2 1 1
(1 )( / )
2 (1 )
y x
y
l t k k kU y x
t t
α α
α
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
                (5.1l) 
We standardize the population of the developing country at one and assume the 
population of the rich coastal region is 2M  and the population of the poor inland region 
2(1 )M− . Exports of good x of the developed country equal the imports of good x of the 
developing country. All the imports of the developing country are conducted through the coastal 
region. However, in terms of the origin of the demand, 2 2
dM x⋅  is from the coastal region and 
2 3 2(1 ) /
dM x k− ⋅  from the inland region. The market clearing condition for good x is then as 
follows 
1 1 2 2 2 3 2(1 ) /
s d dM x M x M x k⋅ = ⋅ + − ⋅                (5.1m)  
We can solve for the optimum labor allocation 1xl  as  
1 1 2 2 2 3
1
1 2 1 1
(2 ) ( (1 ) )
2 2(1 )(2 )
y y
x
y
t lk M Mll
t t M
α α
α
+ + −= + + +                  (5.1n) 
Structure CPC 
An individual in the poor inland region in structure CPC has the same decision problem 
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as in structure PCC. Following the same procedure except validating the corner equilibrium 
relative price at 2 2
2 2(1 )
yx
y x
kpp
p t
α
α= = + , we have the corner solution as 
2 2 3
3
2 2
(1 )
(2 )
x yd
y
t l
x
t
α α
α
+= +                     (5.2a) 
3
3
22
ys ly
t
α= +                       (5.2b) 
2 3
3
2
(1 )
2
yt ly
t
α+= +                      (5.2c) 
0.5
2 3 3 2
3
2 1 2
(1 )
( / )
2 (1 )
y x
y
t l kU y x
t t
α α
α
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
              (5.2d) 
2 2
2 2(1 )
yx
y x
kpp
p t
α
α= = +                       (5.2e) 
 
Structure CCC 
An individual in the inland region has the same decision problem in structure CCC as in 
other structures. Following the same procedure but only validating at 3 3 2 3 2/
d
xR t p x kμ= , we 
thereby have 
2 3
3
2(2 )
yd lkx
t p
α= +                         (5.3a) 
3
3
22
ys ly
t
α= +                       (5.3b) 
2 3
3
2
(1 )
2
yt ly
t
α+= +                      (5.3c) 
1 2 2 2 3
2 1 1
(2 )( (1 ) )
(2 )
y y
x
t M M
p
t M
α α
α
+ + −= +                    (5.3d) 
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0.5
2 1 1 2 3
3 3
1 2 2 2 2 3
(1 )( / )
(2 )(2 )( (1 ) )
x
y
y y
t M k kU y x l
t t M M
αα α α
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + + −⎝ ⎠
             (5.3e) 
 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 provide a summary on these three corner solutions for 
1 2 3 1μ μ μ= = =  and 1 2 3 0μ μ μ= = = ,  respectively. 
5.2. General Equilibrium Analysis 
We focus our attention on the welfare changes in the poor developing country, especially 
the poor inland region in the developing country. Before the developing country takes an 
open-door policy or trade liberalization policy, the initial general equilibrium structure is one of 
structures (AAA, APC, ACP and ACC) listed in Figure 5.1. The transaction efficiency for the 
poor inland region participating in domestic trade with the coastal region is 3k . After trade 
liberalization, the poor inland region participates in international trade through the coastal region 
and the transaction efficiency decreases to 2 3k k
1. This is because the poor inland region faces a 
higher transaction cost in international trade than in domestic trade. Once the transaction 
efficiency ( 2 3k k ) is less than a threshold in which the utility level of individuals in the inland 
region participating in international trade is lower than that choosing autarky, the general 
equilibrium structure may discontinuously switch from the initial general equilibrium structure to 
one of the structures (PCA, CPA and CCA) listed in Figure 5.2 and the poor inland region 
                                                 
1 The poor inland region faces greater transaction costs and lower transaction efficiency in international trade. For 
every one unit of good x imported from the developed country, the coast region can only re-exports k2 unit of the 
import to the inland region due to transaction costs. The inland region will be able to receive and consume only k3 
percent of the k2 unit of imports. Thus, the inland region faces transaction efficiency at 2 3k k  in international trade. 
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participates a lower level of division of labor. Consequentially, the poor inland region suffers 
from trade liberalization in the developing country. If the general equilibrium occurs in structure 
PCC (CPC or CCC), individuals in the poor inland region participate in the division of labor and 
receive higher utility than they do in autarky. Otherwise, individuals will withdraw from 
international trade and choose autarky.  
Marginal comparative statics of our model show again that the deterioration of terms of 
trade does not necessarily lead to the welfare decrease. Suppose that the general equilibrium 
structure occurs in structure PCC where 1 2 3 1μ μ μ= = = . Table 5.1 shows that as the transaction 
efficiency in the developed country ( 1k ) is improved, the relative price of good x to good y 
( 1 1
1 1
(1 ) yx
y x
tpp
p k
α
α
+= = ) decreases. The terms of trade of the developed country is deteriorated. 
However, gains from trade of the developed country increase. The developing country exports 
good y and imports good x and the terms of trade for the developing country is 
1 1
1 1
1
(1 )
y x
x y
p k
p p t
α
α= = +  and thereby improved. We find that utilities of individuals in both regions 
in the developing country ( 2U  and 3U ) are improved and thus gains from trade of the 
developing country increase. The gains from trade of both countries increase, but terms of trade 
deteriorate for the developed country and improve for the developing country.  
Consider that the general equilibrium occurs in structure CPC as in Table 5.1. The coastal 
region in the developing country exports good y and imports good x at a relative price 
2 2
2 2
(1 )1y x
x y
p t
p p k
α
α
+= = . Assuming now that the transaction efficiency in the coastal region in the 
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developing country ( 2k ) is improved, the terms of trade for the coastal region in the developing 
country thereby deteriorate. Individuals in the coastal region in the developing country will 
decrease the amount of labor allocated to produce good x ( 2xl ) and thus the utility level of 
individuals in this region ( 2U ) will increase. Meanwhile, the utility level of individuals in the 
poor inland region ( 3U ) will remain the same as the transaction efficiency in the coastal region 
( 2k ) increases and the terms of trade decrease. As a whole, the developing country benefits from 
transaction efficiency improvement even though the term of trade of the country is deteriorated. 
Thus, our general equilibrium model does not support the common wisdom that the gains from 
trade of a country will fall as terms of trade of this country deteriorate. 
Suppose that productivity of good y in the rich coastal region in the developing country 
( 2 yα ) is improved. Again in the general equilibrium structure CPC, the terms of trade for the 
developing country ( 2 2
2 2
(1 )1y x
x y
p t
p p k
α
α
+= = ) is deteriorated as the productivity of good y ( 2 yα ) is 
improved. However, we observe that utility of individuals in the rich coastal region in the 
developing country ( 2U ) increases and meanwhile utility of individuals in the poor inland region 
( 3U ) decreases. Terms of trade change have different impacts on different groups of individuals 
in the developing country. It is possible that some groups may receive gains from trade while 
others within the same country get hurt as terms of trade deteriorate.  
Table 5.3 shows the welfare impacts of technology progress on the poor inland region in 
the developing country. If structure PCC occurs in the general equilibrium, the utility of 
individuals in the inland region is positively related to the relative productivity between its 
 121
comparatively advantaged good and comparatively disadvantaged good in the developed country 
( 1
1
x
y
α
α ). The terms of trade are affected by this relative productivity. Because export and import 
structure in the developed country is complementary to that in the developing country, the 
increase of this relative productivity induces an increase of import demand of good y from the 
developing country. The inland region thereby has an opportunity to export more good y to the 
developed country at a higher relative price of 2 2
2 2
(1 )1y x
x y
p t
p p k
α
α
+= = . If structure CPC occurs in 
the general equilibrium, the utility of individuals in the inland region is negatively related to the 
relative productivity between its comparatively advantaged good and comparatively 
disadvantaged good in the coastal region of the developing country ( 2
2
y
x
α
α ). This is because that 
export and import structure in coastal region in the developing country is competitory to that in 
the inland region. The increase of this relative productivity induces an increase of import demand 
of good y from the coastal region in the developing country but a decrease of import demand 
from the inland region. The technology progress of its comparatively advantaged good y in the 
inland region (an increase of 3 yα ) is found to contribute to the welfare improvement in all 
possible equilibrium structures ( 3
3 y
U
α
∂
∂ ). Thus, the nature of technology progress (complementary 
or competitory to that in the inland region) has important impacts on the welfare of individuals in 
the inland region.  
Table 5.4 reports the impacts of tariff reduction on per capital real income (utility) in both 
countries. Results in Table 5.4 show that if the general equilibrium occurs in structure PCC, the 
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developed country can increase its own welfare by increasing its tariff rate given the tariff rate in 
the developing country since 1
1
0dU
dt
> . But the welfare gain to the developed country is at the 
expense of the developing country since 2
1
0dU
dt
<  and 3
1
0dU
dt
<  in structure PCC in Table 5.4. 
If the general equilibrium occurs in structure CPC, both coastal region and inland region in the 
developing country will gain from the tariff increase given the tariff rate in the developed country, 
which can be seen that 2
2
0dU
dt
> , 3
2
0dU
dt
>  and 1
2
0dU
dt
<  in structure PCC in Table 5.4. This is 
because the “large country” (the developed country in PCC and the coastal region in the 
developing country in CPC) determines the terms of trade, and thereby this country can improve 
its terms of trade by imposing a tariff and thus obtain a larger share of the gains from trade.  
In contrast to the large country, the small country (the developing country in structure 
PCC and the developed country in structure CPC) will get worse off if the government chooses 
to increase its tariff rate, which can be seen that 2
2
0dU
dt
<  and 3
2
0dU
dt
<  in structure PCC and 
1
1
0dU
dt
<  in structure CPC in Table 5.4. Not only so, an increase of tariff rate in the small 
country will also hurt its trading partner, which can be seen that 1
2
0dU
dt
<  in structure PCC and 
2
1
0dU
dt
<  and 3
1
0dU
dt
=  in structure CPC in Table 5.4. No country and region will benefit from 
tariff increase in the small country. Thus, protection tariff policy is not available for a small 
country to improve their welfare given their negligible influence on terms of trade. 
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If the general equilibrium occurs in structure CCC in which both developed country and 
developing country have certain influence on terms of trade, both countries will enlarge their 
gains from trade if they increase their tariff rate given the tariff level in trading partner country, 
which can be seen that 1
1
0dU
dt
> , 2
2
0dU
dt
> and 3
2
0dU
dt
>  in Table 5.4. However, this is at the 
expense of trading partner country since 2
1
0dU
dt
< , 3
1
0dU
dt
<  and 1
2
0dU
dt
<  in Table 5.4. Thus, 
tariff increase in the developed country will hurt the poor inland region in the developing 
country.  
The story will be different if the government does not transfer tariff revenues to its 
residents, that is 1 2 3 0μ μ μ= = = . As shown in Table 5.5, Welfare of individuals in both rich 
coastal region and poor inland region in the developing country will not change as tariff rate 
change in both developed country and developing countries in structure CPC and structure CCC. 
However, if the developing country increases its tariff rate, the government would collect more 
tariff revenues. Thus, the developing country may have incentives to increase its tariff rate. But a 
tariff increase in the developing country will be opposed by the developed country because this 
hurts individuals there, which can be seen that 1 2 0U t∂ ∂ <  in structure CPC and structure CCC 
in Table 5.5. Because an increase of gains from trade via protection tariff (either transferred to 
individuals in the country or solely reaped by the government as tariff revenues) is generally at 
an expense of another country, trade negotiation becomes necessary to determine the share of 
gains from trade of each country.  
Copyright © Xuehua Peng 2006 
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Figure 5.1: Configurations and market structures when international trade is absent 
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Table 5.3: Welfare Impacts of Technology in the 3X2 Ricardian Model 
Structure 3
1 1( )x y
U
α α
∂
∂  
3
2 y
U
α
∂
∂  
3
3y
U
α
∂
∂  
PCC + 0 + 
 3
2x
U
α
∂
∂  
3
2 y
U
α
∂
∂  
3
3y
U
α
∂
∂  
CPC + - + 
 3
1x
U
α
∂
∂  
3
2 y
U
α
∂
∂  
3
3y
U
α
∂
∂  
CCC + - + 
 
  
Table 5.4: Welfare Impacts of Tariff Change in the 3X2 Ricardian Model ( 1 2 3 1μ μ μ= = = ) 
The Developing country 
The Developed Country 
Coastal Region Inland Region 
Structure 
1 1U t∂ ∂  1 2U t∂ ∂  2 1U t∂ ∂ 2 2U t∂ ∂  3 1U t∂ ∂  3 2U t∂ ∂  
PCC + - - - - - 
CPC - - - + 0 + 
CCC + - - + - + 
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Table 5.5: Welfare Impacts of Tariff Change in the 3X2 Ricardian Model ( 1 2 3 0μ μ μ= = = ) 
The Developing country 
The Developed Country
Coastal Region Inland Region 
Structure 
1 1U t∂ ∂  1 2U t∂ ∂  2 1U t∂ ∂ 2 2U t∂ ∂  3 1U t∂ ∂  3 2U t∂ ∂  
PCC 0 0 - - - - 
CPC - - 0 0 0 0 
CCC - - 0 0 0 0 
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CHAPTER SIX  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS,  
AND FURTHER RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
 
6.1. Policy Implications 
Our model of division of labor on poverty delineates the interdependent relationship 
between individuals in the poor inland region and the individuals in the rich coastal region and 
the developed country. Market integration (trade) plays a very important role in such 
interdependency. The division of labor and the extent of market integration (trade) depends on 
each other and reinforce each other. Thus, it is critical to develop the market and thus to improve 
the market transaction efficiency in the poor inland region. 
Our model finds that as an important part of trade liberalization policy, tariff reduction 
may not always be a good policy choice for the developing country to alleviate the poverty in the 
inland region. Whether tariff reduction makes the inland region better off depends on the initial 
general equilibrium market structure and the power of the developing country influencing the 
terms of trade. If the developing country is large enough to determine the terms of trade in 
international trade with the developed country, the developing country may increase the welfare 
level of the poor inland region by increasing its tariff rate. But the developed country will oppose 
it because the tariff rate increase in the developing country will hurt its welfare. Trade 
negotiation is then necessary to determine the final tariff rate and the share of gains of trade 
accrued to each country and region.  
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In contrast to the large country position of the developing country in international trade, 
the small country can not use a protective tariff to improve its welfare. When all the countries 
have some influence on the terms of trade, the developing country can choose a protective tariff 
as a policy instrument to increase the welfare of the poor. Thus, population size matters to the 
poverty effects of trade liberalization. Due to its huge population size, China may have greater 
impacts on the world market equilibrium price than other developing countries. Thus, China’s 
experiences in the trade-poverty relationship does not necessarily apply to other developing 
countries simply because of huge differences in population size.  
Our model finds that relative productivity between the rich coastal region and the poor 
inland region affects individuals’ welfare in the poor areas. In equilibrium, both coastal and 
inland regions export good y. The two regions have a competitive relationship in international 
trade. As the relative productivity gap between the two regions increases, individuals’ welfare in 
the poor area will shrink. Different productivity levels are usually associated with regional 
inequality. Thus, our model supports Ravallion’s view that initial inequality conditions affect 
how much the poor can share in the rising average income. During the past reform period, 
differential regional development strategy has contributed to the fast development in the coastal 
region, but also resulted in large regional inequality (coastal-inland inequality and urban-rural 
inequality). To make the poverty alleviation effort more effective, it is the time for the Chinese 
government to attack the issue of widening regional disparity. China’s Western Development 
Strategy (WDS), adopted since September 1999, indicates that China is moving in this direction. 
At the top of China’s WDS agenda are: transportation, telecommunications, energy, urban 
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infrastructure, forestry, mining, minerals, and agriculture. Special attention is also being paid to 
environmental protection, water conservation, and education reform. Over a ten-year period, the 
Chinese government expects to spend approximately $200 to 250 billion US on these projects.  
It is critical to develop the market and thus to improve the market transaction efficiency 
in the poor inland region. If the transaction efficiency of the inland region in the developing 
country is very low, the poor inland region may be excluded from domestic and international 
division of labor under an open-door policy and trade liberalization policy. However, under a 
close-door system or with high trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff trade barriers), the developed 
country may be excluded from international division of labor. The poor inland region then has 
the opportunity to join in domestic division of labor with the rich coastal region. Thus, an 
open-door policy or trade liberalization policy do not necessarily help lift the poor inland region 
out of poverty. The tiny share of the poor inland region in China’s international trade indicates 
that the poor inland region is at the edge of being excluded from international trade. When the 
rich coastal region in China reaps large gains of international trade with the developed country, 
this will reinforce the rich coastal region to participate more division of labor with the developed 
country instead of with the poor inland region. As a result, this may leave the poor inland region 
further behind.  
One may argue that increasing rural labor immigration from the poor inland region to the 
rich coastal region can enable the poor to participate in the division of labor. As suggested by 
Lewis’s dual economy model, surplus labor in the traditional sector moves to the modern sector, 
providing incentives for economic development. However, due to the residential registration 
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system constraints in China, those rural labor workers immigrating into the coastal region can 
only have temporary residential status. There are huge discriminations against these rural 
workers. Many of them move from rural poor people to urban poor people. In addition, most of 
their family members still stay in the poor inland region. Without the development of the inland 
region, the Chinese government cannot successfully achieve its poverty alleviation goals because 
most of the poor in the inland region may be still excluded from domestic and international 
division of labor.  
Improvement of transaction efficiency (i.e., transportation and information infrastructure, 
business skills) may provide a way for the poor inland region to get out of such exclusion from 
division of labor. However, it is a relatively long and gradual process to improve the transaction 
efficiency in the poor inland region. Thus, the developing countries should be careful about 
taking a “big bang” approach to of trade liberalization. Although China is not likely to take the 
“big bang” approach, the speed of opening-up is still an important research topic in order to 
buffer the negative impacts on the division of labor in the poor inland region.  
As we refer transaction cost to any cost involved in market transactions, transaction 
efficiency is affected by many factors including infrastructure conditions, degree of urbanization, 
transportation conditions, communication conditions, and the general institutional environment. 
Our model shows that high transaction costs (low transaction efficiency) is the bottle-neck 
constraint on the poor inland region’s integration into international division of labor through 
international trade. With the low level of international and domestic trade, advanced technology 
embodied in traded goods cannot be diffused into the poor inland region. As Pfeffermann and 
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Fields commented,  
 
“No single factor such as investment or education can ‘ignite’ development. Much 
depends, rather, on the pace at which poor societies can adapt knowledge that already exists in 
the more economically advanced parts of the world and put it to use. The challenge is how to 
bring about conditions in which knowledge accumulated over decades, and indeed centuries, can 
be usefully absorbed and effectively utilized in poorer countries.” 
          -- Fields and Pfeffermann, 2003. page 6 
 
The low level of technology diffusion places a constraint on the productivity and 
economic growth of the poor inland region in turn. Geographic disadvantages are accentuated as 
the main barriers for the poor inland region in China to participate in division of labor to improve 
its technology level (Heilig et al., 2005). From the perspective of division of labor, those 
geographic disadvantages increase the transportation costs of goods and lower the transaction 
efficiency, thereby entraping the labor division of the poor inland region into a low level in 
general equilibrium. However, we must be aware that transportation costs are only part of the 
transaction costs. More importantly, other factors including information technology and 
institutional environments may overcome the geographic disadvantages to promote market 
development in the poor inland region. As McCulloch et al. pointed out, 
 
“Increasingly, informational failure are being recognized as a key constraint that the poor 
face. With little or no access to reliable information, poor households are likely to be extremely 
averse to taking actions to exploit opportunities when they cannot be sure that such opportunities 
are real.” 
 
In today’s information age, information can be “transported” from the developed region 
to the poor region easily at a very low cost compared to goods transportation based on the 
existing telecommunication system. The poverty alleviation programs should take full advantage 
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of modern information technology to provide services (including marketing information, online 
education and health consulting) to the poor inland region so that it can get around the 
geographic barriers before an efficient infrastructure system in the poor inland region is built. 
During the past two and a half decades of reform, the Chinese government has created 
the institutional climate to expand division of labor and to improve the market integration in 
China (Cai and Wang, 2003).  Cai and Wang calculated a marketization index to measure the 
relationship between institutional reform and economic growth in China (Figure 6.1)1. The figure 
shows that the western inland region has seen a relatively slow market development and low 
division of labor which has not reach the extent to efficiently allocate resources. Thus, China’s 
further reform and opening-up should lend a sustained impetus to market development and 
division of labor to exert comparative advantages of the inland region in order to alleviate the 
poverty in the inland region. The Chinese government should pay attention to the possibility that 
trade liberalization may crowd out the poor inland region from the division of labor, as we 
analyzed earlier.  
 
6.2 Conclusions 
The relationship between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation in the developing 
country has been a hotly debated topic in economics research recently. This research endeavors 
to analyze the poverty impacts of trade liberalization from the perspective of division of labor. 
                                                 
1 The Marketization index is calculated by arithmetic average of share of trade in GDP, share of non-state-owned 
enterprises in total social commodity sales, share of non-state-owned enterprises in total social fixed assets 
investment, and share of non-state-owned enterprises in total output value of industry. 
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Since the majority of the poor in a developing country, i.e., China., usually cluster in the poor 
inland region, the welfare impacts of trade liberalization on the whole developing country do not 
necessarily reflect the true poverty impacts of trade liberalization. Thus, we refine our lens of 
poverty on the poor inland region by dividing the developing country into the poor inland region 
and a rich coastal region.  
Our model considers division of labor as a fundamental characteristic of social economic 
activities. The poor in the inland region participate in interregional and international division of 
labor with individuals in the coastal region in the developing country and in the developed 
country. Due to different exogenous technological comparative advantages and constraints of 
transaction efficiency, division of labor in general equilibrium manifests itself at different levels. 
If division of labor in general equilibrium evolves from a lower level to a higher level, i.e., from 
a partial division of labor to a complete division of labor, individuals in the inland region will 
receive higher utility and thus have an opportunity to escape from poverty.  
In the voluminous literature on poverty, the theory of division of labor on poverty can 
integrate all other theories. Any factors affecting poverty (poverty alleviation or poverty 
entrapment) at the individual, regional, national and international level will change the division 
of labor in the socioeconomic system and the associated welfare levels. Our model can 
accommodate theories analyzing impacts of geographic conditions, market integration and 
institutions (Diamond, 1997; Gallup et al., 1998; Sachs, 2001; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Sachs 
and Warner, 1995; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Rodrik et al., 2004). All these factors (geographic conditions, market integration and 
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institutions) influence transaction costs and transaction efficiency, and thus determine the general 
equilibrium division of labor and individuals’ welfare levels.  
At the micro level, individuals’ and households’ characteristics are also recognized as 
important factors determining their poverty status. From the perspective of division of labor, 
these micro factors (individual’s gender, education, health, etc.) mean that different types of 
individuals have different transaction costs in market. Facing different transaction costs, 
individuals will make different optimum decisions of production and consumption and thus reach 
different general equilibrium levels in division of labor. Even though our current model assumes 
all consumers and producers are ex ante identical, we can apply the approach of division of labor 
by dividing individuals into different types according to their characteristics.  
The theory of division of labor on poverty can thus integrate all theories analyzing 
poverty determinants at the macro, meso and micro levels. Transaction efficiency plays a key 
role in the theory of division of labor on poverty. The evolution process of division of labor 
usually involves improvements in transaction efficiency.  
 
6.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
In this current version of the new classical trade-poverty model, we do not consider 
endogenous comparative advantage. The comparative advantage of production of one good is 
determined not only by the exogenous technology and resource endowments but also 
endogenous specialization. When there exist economies of endogenous specialization, the 
developing country may have endogenous comparative advantage but exogenous comparative 
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disadvantage in a good. If the endogenous comparative advantage in a good dominates, the 
developing country will export this good regardless of the exogenous comparative disadvantage 
in this good. More structures may then occur in general equilibrium and therefore much richer 
equilibrium mechanisms through which the poor inland region can grow out of poverty can be 
investigated.  
We assume that all individuals are ex ante identical consumer-producers in each country 
and region. That is, the inland region consists of all ex ante individuals in poverty and the rich 
coastal region consists of all ex ante individuals not in poverty. Thus, we fail to investigate the 
poverty impacts of trade liberalization on the poor in the rich coastal region. We may assume that 
there are two groups of ex ante different individuals (poor and non-poor) in the rich coastal 
region to examine the poverty impacts of trade liberalization on the poor in both the inland 
region and the coastal region. 
The poor often face a dilemma that they should choose consumption today to increase 
their current utility, or savings/investment today to increase their ability to guarantee future 
utility level. This is a dynamic instead of a static decision problem. Thus, another possibility for 
future research is to reformat individuals’ decision problem into a dynamic optimization 
problem.  
Compared to other households, poor households in the developing country are usually 
more vulnerable to serious shocks. Natural disasters such as flood, droughts, and market failures 
may have a longer and greater welfare impacts on poor households. Given different risk 
preferences, poor households may have different consumption preferences, technology adoption 
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preferences and investment preferences. Thus, another future research direction is to incorporate 
risk parameter into our trade-poverty model to examine how risk preferences affect the division 
of labor and thereby welfare of the poor.  
There are an increasing number of rural workers mobilizing from the poor inland region 
to the rich coastal region in China since mid-1990s. Due to constraints of the current household 
registration system in China, most of them can only become temporary residents in coastal 
regions. These temporary rural workers send large amounts of remittances back to their family in 
the poor inland region. This round of rural workers mobilization and associated remittances are 
expected to have great impacts on poverty alleviation. Thus, a challenge to our model is how to 
incorporate labor mobilization and remittances endogenously into our model of division of labor.  
Another natural extension of our model is to develop a Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model. In 
addition to resource endowments and technological comparative advantages, the HO model 
integrates capital endowment and accumulation into determination of a nation’s exogenous 
comparative advantage. Thus, the HO model can be used to illustrate how the capital factor 
affects the poor inland region’s participation in division of labor and associated welfare change 
in the absence of Ricardo’s technological comparative advantage.  
There already exists a large body of empirical work on poverty impacts of trade 
liberalization as mentioned in chapter 2. However, most work is in the spirit of neoclassical 
economics and few follows the spirit of new classical economics. This is because that new 
classical economics just emerged recently and the current econometrics methods are mainly 
designed for neoclassical economics. It is a challenging and rewarding area to develop 
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appropriate econometrics methods in a spirit of new classical economics in order to conduct 
empirical work on results from our new classical model.  
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Figure 6.1: Trend of Marketization Index by Regions in China: 1978-1998 
 
Source: Cai and Wang, 2003.  
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